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SECONDDORDER REASONS ?

UNCERTAINTY AND LEGAL

THEORY
STEPHEN R. PERRY*

INTRODUCTION
It is an obvious and banal fact that reasons for action often conflict,
which is simply to say that they often call for different and incompatible
courses of action. Ordinarily we resolve such conflicts by assessing the
relative weight or strength of all the relevant reasons and then deciding
in favor of that action which has the greatest overall support. T his process, which Professor Joseph Raz calls determining what ought to be
done on the balance of reasons, 1 is clearly a fundamental and commonly
employed mode of practical reasoning. T he reasons which we take into
account when relying on this mode are, in Raz's terminology, first- order
reasons; they are reasons for action that have been drawn directly from
considerations of interest, desire or morality. 2

It is one of Raz's most important philosophical insights to have
noticed that determining what ought to be done on the balance of firstorder reasons is not the only mode of practical reasoning upon which
people rely. Sometimes we decide what to do on the basis of what R az
calls second- order reasons, which he defines as "reason[s] to act on or
refrain from acting on a reason. " 3 T he most important category of second- order reasons recognized by Raz is that of exclusionary or peremptory reasons. T hese are reasons to refrain from acting on a reason.
Exclusionary reasons give rise to the possibility of another ty pe of conflict between reasons in addition to first- order conflicts, namely, confl icts
between a firs t- order reason and an exclusionary reason for not acting on
the first- order reason. When such a conflict occurs, according to Raz,
''
Assista nt Professo r of Law, McGi ll U ni versit y. I a m indebted to Ken Kress and Joseph
R az for comme nts on ear lier drafts. I would also lik e to thank Ronald Dworkin and J eremy
Waldron fo r he lpful di sc ussions on topics whi c h a re dea lt with in thi s paper.
I. J. RAZ, PRA CTI CAL REASON AND NORMS 36 ( 1975).
2. !d . at 34.
3. Jd . a t 39; see a/so J. RA Z, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 16-17 (1979).
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the exclusionary reason always prevails just by virtue of being a reason of
a higher order. 4 The exclusionary reason does not override or outweigh
the first- order reason but simply excludes it from consideration by the
agent.
Raz's distinction between first- and second-order reasons is a major
contribution to the philosophy of practical reason and the found ation
upon which much of his work in legal and political as well as in practical
philosophy is built. He has used it, for example, to analyze the concept
of a ru le in a more precise and fruitful manner than had previously been
possible, namely as an exclusionary reason of general application which
is also a first- order reason for action. 5 This analysis has permitted him to
show how rules are able to provide an intermediate level of practical reasoning which is capable of mediating between concrete decisions and ultimate reasons or values. 6 The idea of rules as mediating devices in
practical reasoning figures in turn as an important element in Raz's analysis of practical and political authority, an analysis which he then draws
upon in his formulation and defense of legal positivism. The distinction
between first- and second- order reasons is thus the heart of a comprehensive and powerful system of thought in which legal and political philosophy are shown to be deeply rooted in the soil of a subtle and carefully
worked-out practical philosophy.
As Raz has correctly observed, "[p]hilosophers have tended too
often to avoid facing the complexities of practical reasoning with its
multi-level assessments .... Many ... pessimistic conclusions are based
upon a confusion between the epistemological difficulties in establishing
the validity of ultimate values and the logical difficulties in explaining the
considerations often found in practical reasoning. " 7 This Paper will
attempt to show that Raz himself has underestimated the complexities of
multi-level assessments in practical reasoning because he circumscribes
the possible categories of second-order reasons too narrowly. Raz's own
definition and theoretical utilization of second-order reasons emphasize
the possibility of isolating a level of practical reasoning from the considerations and values which ultimately justify the decisions being taken.
The notion of a second-order reason is in fact far richer than Raz allmvs,
4. J. RAZ, supra note I, at 46.
5. !d. at 73; see also Raz, Promises and Obligations, in LAw, MORALITY
221-22 (P.M.S. Hacker & J. Raz eds. 1977).
6. See, e.g., J. RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 58 (1986).
7. J. RAZ, supra note I, at 94-95.
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and there exist second-order reasons for action upon which people commonly rely, mainly in institutional contexts, that do not have the isolating effect he describes. Reliance on these reasons requires at least some
fam iliarity, and often a great deal, with the ultimate values and other
justifying reasons which figure in first- order practical reasoning. The
most important context in which second- order reasons of this non-isolating ty pe are to be found is legal reasoning. T heir prominence in common
Jaw reasoning in particular casts doubt upon at least certain aspects of
Raz's posi tivism and lends support to what is essentially a Dworkinian
theory of law.
The Paper is di vided into two main Parts. The first is concerned
with certain aspects of practica l philosophy generally, while the second
focuses on the philosophy of law. The first Part begins with a brief overview of Raz's account of how exclusionary reasons figure in practical
reasoning. This is followed by a discussion of the general nature of reasons and of the forms which practical reasoning can take when agents are
uncertain about what right reason requires. While this may seem at first
to constitute something of a detour away from the main concerns of the
Paper, it will lead to the clarification of some basic notions and the formulation of certain distinctions which will facilitate the development of
the argument to follow. A critical examination of Raz's account of the
concept of authority is then undertaken. After it has first been shown
that Raz's notion of an exclusionary reason is ambiguous, it is argued
that reliance on the type of exclusionary reason that figures in his analysis of authority, which will be referred to as a subjective exclusionary
reason, represents a rational strategy that agents can or should adopt in
order to deal with uncertainty about what action right reason demands.
Once this is understood, it becomes possible to define two new types of
subjective second- order reasons that allow agents to formulate strategies
for dealing with uncertainty which, unlike the exclusionary approach,
enable them to continue to take the underlying first- order reasons into
consideration.
T he second Part of the Paper, which deals with the philosophy of
law, begins by outlining how Raz makes use of the idea of a (subjective)
exclusionary reason in order to defend a particularly powerful and probably definitive version of positivism . It is then shown that the two newlydefined categories of second- order reasons can be utilized to formulate
an interpretation of the common law process of decisionmaking which is
superior to Raz's own positivist interpretation. This offers strong support for the conclusion that positivism cannot provide a complete
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account of the foundations of law, and that at the very least it has to be
supplemented by a theory which in its most fundamental respects resembles that of R onald Dworkin.

I.
A.

PRACT ICAL PHILOSOPHY

RAZ O N EXCLU SIONARY REASONS IN PRACT IC AL R EA SONING

It has already been mentioned that Raz defines a second- order reason as a reason to act for a reason or to refrain from acting for a reason.
H e pays very little attention, however, to positive second- order reasons,
which are reasons to act for a reason. It is negative second- order reasons,
which are reasons to refrain from acting for a reason , that figure most
prominently in his theoretical work. 8 He also calls negative secondorder reasons exclusionary or peremptory reasons. 9 R az defends the thesis that determining what ought to be done on the basis of an exclusionary reason is a distinct mode of practical reasoning by pointing to the
ways in which people actually do deliberate about what they ought to do.
F or example, a soldier who has been given an order to do an action
which he thinks cannot be justified on the balance of reasons will ordinarily regard the order as a reason for him not to act on his view of the
merits of the case rather than as simply another reason which is to be
added to the balance of reasons. As Raz says, "we would be disregarding
[the soldier's] own conception of the situation if we were to say that he
regards the order as an overriding first-order reason." 10 The soldier conceives of the order as an exclusionary reason which is also a first-order
reason to do the action that he was ordered to perform. Suppose that the
soldier nonetheless disregards the order and acts on his own, correct
assessment of the balance of reasons. H is superior offi cer will now, says
Raz, " be torn between conflicting feelings," since he is fa ced with conduct which he concedes was right on the merits but which he nonetheless
thinks was wrong in disregarding an exclusionary reason. 1 1 The conflict
felt by the superior officer is an indication that he is aware that the soldier's action can be assessed in two different and incompatible ways. It is
an indication, that is to say, that he recognizes that there are two distinct
modes of practical reasoning, one of which demands that a person act on
8.

Raz discusses negative and positive second-order reasons in

j.

RAZ, supra note 3, at 17.

9. For criticism of Raz's notion of an exclusionary reason see Gans, lWandatory Rules and
Exclusionary Reasons, 15 PHILOSOPHIA 373 ( 1986).
10.

J. RAZ, supra note 1, at 42; cf id. at 74-75; J. RAZ, supra note 3, at 22-23.

11.

J. RAz, supra note i, at 43.
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his own assessment of the balance of reasons and the other of which
demands that he disregard that assessment.
Raz argues that such practical phenomena as promising, com plying
with an order, acting on advice, taking a decision and follo wing a rule
must all be a nalyzed in terms of the acceptance of an exclusionary reason
for actio n. 12 But his concern is not just with the phenomenology of practical reaso ning . H e wishes to establish mo re than that peopl e do, in fact ,
sometimes determ ine what they ough t to do by reasoning in an exclu sionary rr1an n.:r. H e also maintains that there can be valid exclusionary
reasons, i.e., there can be excl usionary reasons upon which people are
justified in ac ting. It has already been mentioned that Raz analyzes the
notion of a ru le as a general exclusionary reason which is also a firstorder reason for some particular course of action. As he points out, it is
quite plausible to suppose that indi viduals will sometimes be better off in
their everyday lives if they follo\v rules of thumb which have this logical
structure than they would be if they were to decide what to do in each
relevant situation by assessing the balance of reasons on a case by case
basis. Following a predetermined course of action could well reduce
overall error when one has to act in circumstances of impaired rationality, for example. 13 I t is also obvious that following a rule which one has
adopted in advance in order to deal with a particular type of situation
that is expected to recur could in principle be justified by the time and
effort which would be saved in not having to reassess the balance of reasons on every relevant occasion. 14
R az further argues tha t it can be rational not simply to follow an
exclusionary reason which one has formulated for oneself, at a tim e
before the rel evan t situation or series of situations has arisen, but also to
treat the utterances of another person as exclusionary reasons for action.
To treat another person (or an institution) as a practical authority, for
example, means that one accepts the directives of that person (or institution) as exclusionary reasons applicable to oneself. 15 When one person
has authority over another the former possesses a type of normative
power which enables him or her to change the latter's protected reasons,
these being exclusionary reasons which are also first-order reasons . 16
12. See id. at 49-84; see also J. RAZ, supra note 3, at 21-25, 30. On promises see Raz, supra
no te 5, at 210-2 8.
13. J. RAZ, supra note I, a t 37-38 , 59-60.
14. !d. at 59- 60; see also R az, supra note 5, a t 224.
15 . J. RA Z, supra note 3, at 26.
16. !d. at 21; cf 1. RAZ, supra note 6, at 24. Raz defines protected reason s in J. RAZ , supra
note 3, at 18.
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Raz defends what he calls the " service conception" of authority, which
regards authorities as "mediating between people and the right reasons
which apply to them, so that the autho rity judges and pronounces what
they ought to do acco rding to right reason." 17 T he normal and primary
way of justifying the legitimacy of an authori ty is to show that the person
over ·whom authority is claimed "is likely better to com ply with reasons
which apply to him (other than the alleged d irectives) if he accepts t he
directives of t he alleged authority as aut horitati vely bind ing and tries to
follow them, rather than by t rying to follovv the reasons which appl y to
him directl y." 16 Raz refers to this claim as the normal justification thesis.
According to the service conception, aut horities should base their directives on reasons which apply to their subjects. (Raz calls both reasons
which apply to the subjects and reasons wh ich are meant to reflect such
reasons dependent reasons. 19 ) But a legitimate authority cannot carry
out its mediating role unless its subjects treat its directives as reasons for
action which replace some of the reaso ns which would otherwise be relevant in assessing what they ought to do and not simply as reasons that
are to be ad ded to those original reasons. 20 Subjects should, in other
words, treat the authority's directives as exclusionary reasons for action.
Raz's analysis of the concept of legitimate authority effectively
rebuts the anarchist claim that the concept is necessarily incompatible
with rationality, since he shows that the directives of an authority could
in principle be valid exclusionary reasons which it would be rational for a
person to follow .2 1 He also outlines a number of ways in which the legitimacy of a practical authority, including a political authority such as the
government of a state, could in fact be established. 22 One way is to show
the authority to be wiser than the individual in determining what ought
to be done in a particular type of situati on. Another requires a demonstration that the authority is in a better position than the individual to
achieve what the latter has reason to ac hieve but cannot, such as soiving
coo rdination problems or changing the structure of prisoner's dilemmatype situations. 2 3 Raz is of the opinion that such considerations are in
fact capable of justifying political authority, but only on a piecemeal
basis and only up to a point. The extent of a government's authority is
17. Raz, A u1hori1y. Law and
note 6, at 55-56.
18. J. RAZ, supra note 6, at
!9. J. RA Z, supra note 6, at
20. !d. at 57-59 .
21. J. RA Z, supra note 3, at
22. J. RAZ, supra not e 6, at
23. J. RAZ , supra no te 6, a t

Mo ra!iry, 68 THE MONiST 295 , 299 ( 1985); see also J. RAZ, supra
53; see also Raz, supra note 17 , at 299.
41.
27 ; J. RAZ, supra note 6, a t 57 , 68.
75; cf J. RAZ, supra no te I, at 63-64.
49-51.
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likely to vary from individual to individual, and will in the case of most
persons be more limited than the unrestricted authority which governments actually claim for themselves.24
There are three other points about Raz's conception of an exclusionary second- order reason which are worth mentioning here. The fir st is
that exclusionary reasons can differ in scope. This simply means that an
excl usionary reason may exclude only som e of the reasons which would
otherw ise be applicable in a gi ven situation, and that the range of
excl uded reasons can vary. 2 5 T hus an authority, for example, can be limited not just by the kinds of acts which it is justified !n regulating but also
by the kinds of reasons upon which it may rely and which its decisions
will preempt. 2 6 The second point is that Raz uses the notion of an exclusionary reason to explain the concept of an obligation or duty. This is
accomplished in the following way: "An action is obligatory if it is
required by a categorical rule, i.e. [an exclusionary] rule which applies to
its subjects not merely because adherence to it facilitates achievement of
their goals.'m , T he third point is that being subject to the authority of
another and therefore, according to Raz, possessing a duty to treat that
other's directives as exclusionary reasons, does not entail that one is not
permitted to form a judgment of what ought to be done on the balance of
reasons. Authority does not require a "surrender of judgment" in this
strong sense; the only thing which is necessarily excluded is action on
one's judgment of what ought to be done. 28
B.

PRACTICAL REASO N ING AN D UNCERTAINTY

Section C undertakes a critical inquiry into the nature of exclusionary reasons as these figure in R az's analysis of the concept of authority.
This will enable us to see that there are in fact more types of secondorder reasons than Raz acknowledges. First, however, it will be helpful
to say something about the general nature of reasons for action, paying
particular attention to the fact that practical reasoning must often take
place under conditions of uncertainty. This will clarify certain matters
24. !d. at 80.
25 . J. RA Z, sup ra no te I, at 40; J. RAZ , sup ra note 3, a t 22.
26. J. RA Z, supra note 6, at 46- 4 7.
27. Raz, supra note 5, a t 223; cf J. RAZ, supra note 3, at 234-35. S ee also J. RAZ, supra note
6, at 186, 195; J. RAZ, supra note I, at 76 (moral duties are ex c lusionary in nature). Donald Regan
argues pe rsuasively th a t R a z's account o f a uthorit y, while broad ly co rrec t, cannot sus tain th e conclusion that th e subjects of even a legitima te auth o rit y have a duty to obey the auth o rity's direc tives.
See Regan, Au1hori1y and Value: Refieaing on R az 's 1l,foralily of Freedom, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 995
( 19 89) . T his is not an issu e which will be discu ssed in this Paper.
28. J. R AZ, supra note 6, at 29; J. R AZ, supra note 3, a t 26 n.25 .
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and yield certain di sti nctions which will be of use in the disc ussion to
follow.
1.

Raz on the Na ture of Reasons

In Practica l R eason and Norms an d other rel ati vely early works Raz
dravvs a distinction between two different ·;;.;ays that we common ly talk
" actJOn
· .-'9 H
, . sometimes
·
1 01.c reasons
a b out reasons ror
:· e notes tna{
we speaK
as facts, while at other times we speak of them as beliefs. (The concept of
a "fact" is to be understood here as incl udin g values and moral principles
as well as events and processes. 30 ) Thus we refer both to the fact that it
wi ll rain and to a belief that ii will rs.in as reasons for carrying an
umbrella. R az acknowledges that one could distinguish in this way
between two distinct notions of reason, but he goes on t o say this :
Only reasons understood as facts are normatively significant; only they
determine what ought to be done. To decide what we should do we
must find what the world is like, and not what our thoughts are like.
The other notion of reasons is relevant excl usively for explanatory purposes and not at all for guiding pu rposes. 3 1

In thus maintaining that only reasons understood as fac ts are normatively significant it would appear that Raz is not simply stating the
obvious truth that it is only facts about the physical world, morality, and
one's desires and interests that ultimately determine what ought to be
done. H e seems to be saying in addition that practical reasoning can be
adequately characterized without reference to the beliefs which agents
hold about their reasons, so that a theory of practical reasoning need
only refer to the idea of reasons as facts . A gents are to be regarded as
deliberating about what to do on the assumption that certain facts which
could serve as reasons obtain (or that they do not obtain). Sometimes
they will discover after they have acted tha t this assumption did not
hold, and it is in this situation t hat the ;dea of reasons understood as
beliefs serves its explanatory fun ction: "It is mostly when we come to
believe that the reason on which we relied does not obtain that we cite
our belief in it as a reason." 32 But for ex ante guiding purposes, as
opposed to ex post explanatory purposes, the assump ti on is to be
29. J. RAZ, supra no te 1, a t 16-19: see also Raz. Inlroduction, in P RACTICAL REASONING 1, 24 (J. Raz ed. 1978).
30. J. RAZ, sup ra note 1, at 17-18.
31. !d. at 18.
32 . !d. According to Raz, ta lk of reasons as beliefs could be replaced even in explan a tory
con texts by a m od e o f speak in g wh ic h co nform ed wit h hi s own analysis if we were to sa y aft er the
fact that we did no t have a reaso n but that we had a reaso n fo r thinking we had a rea so n.
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regarded as sound; practical reasoning is essentially just a matter of
m anipulating statements about states of affairs w hich, if they obtained,
would be both facts and reasons, where the agent's beli ef in the tru th of
t hose statements is taken as given. T hus Raz defines an atomic complete
reason as "the fact(s) stated by the premises of a sound practical inferr:nce ·with no red undant premises. " 33 (Of the different reasons t hat can
comprise a complete reason, those which state valid goals are operative;
o. 1l ~; fners are refe rred to as auxilimy. 3 -+) Raz then defines practi ca l reasoning as ''the transition (not necessarily conscious) from belief in the
pcerrdses to acceptance of the putative conclusion of a practical infer enr: t::." 35 (The conclusion of a practical inference is always, according to
36 )
'-'
,.).....,-:.. :: "~J r1 ,o.o,...1l t;c
i ' .'::
.•. ,_, s t"'~em<"n
v.- __ .... LL.
-..-..,

-r hat Raz holds a view of practical reasonin g along th e lines just
sketched is confirmed by his discussion of a certain type of reason which
h e says does not fit easily into his basic analysis of reasons understood as
facts . He has in mind such reasons as "the probability that p," " the
prospect that p," "the danger that p," etc., all of which, he says, "com··
bine assertion or presupposition of a reason for belief with the assertion
of a reason for action." 37 For example, Raz analyzes the statement "The
probability that it will rain is a reason for taking an umbrella" as asserting the following: "There is a reason to believe that it will rain and that
it will rain is a reason for taking an umbrella." 38 T his analysis seems to
eliminate the need to refer to epistemic notions in the characterization of
practica l reasoning proper: the reasons upon which agents understand
themselves to be acting are facts (in the example, the fact that it will
rain). where the reasons for believing t hat the facts obtain fall outside t he
scope of practical (as opposed to theoretical) reason; as explained above,
belief in the premises which state the relevant facts is assumed. Raz thus
seerns to be putting forward a view of practical reasoning which presuppos~s a pre-practica l stage at which the agent determines, by means of
theoreticai reason, w hat beliefs about the world it is justifiable to maintain . The second stage is the stage of practical reasoning pro per, where
th e agent decides w hat to do on the assumption that he or she holds true
beliefs about which facts capable of serving as reasons for action do or do
33 . Raz, supra note 29, at 5; see also J. RAZ, supra note I, at 22-25 (discussing the concept of
complete rea sons).
34. Raz, supra note 29 , at 15; see also J. RAZ, sup ra note I, at 33-35 ("Most operative reason s
are either va lues or desires or interests•'). !d. at 34.
35. Raz. supra note 29, at 5 (emphasis added).
36. J. RAZ, supra note I, a t 28; see also Raz, supra note 29, a t 5-8.
37 . J. R;,z, supra note I, at 21.
38. !d.
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not obtain. At this second stage epistemic notions essentially drop out of
the picture, since they are not taken into account by the agent in determining vvhat to do.
2.

:The Objective Ba lance of Reasons

This picture of practical reasoning IS at best a misleading and
incomplete one. To see how and why this is so, it will be helpful to begin
by adopting the follow ing terminology. T he balance of reasons under stood as facts will be referred to as the obj ective balance of reasons. The
objective balance of reasons consists of all practical inferences and weighing processes that wo uld be carried out by an agent who, when deciding
what ought to be done in a particular situation, possessed true inform ation about all relevant facts and who in addition reasoned validly at every
stage of his or her practical deliberations. (Raz sometimes uses the
expression "right reaso n" to refer to what seems to be essentially the
same idea.) A single complete reason which figures in the objective balance of reasons will be referred to as an objective reason, or a reason in
the objective sense. Finally, a given person's process of reasoning about
what ought to be done in a particular situation, where it is now possible
that the person might not possess all relevant information and that he or
she might make mistakes, will be referred to as that person's subjective
(practical) determination of what ought to be done. The view of practical
reasoning defended by Raz maintains, in effect, that an agent always
assumes that his or her subjective practical determination coincides with
the objective balance of reasons. 39 This assumption might be mistaken in
a particular case, and the agent might come to discover that mistake after
the fac t, but the agent is nonetheless to be regarded as always relying on
the ass umption at the time of deliberation and action .
Consider the fo llowing example. Assume that it is going to rain
today, and also that the only operative reason I have for carrying an
umbrella is my desire to avoid getting wet. From the perspective of the
objective balance of reasons I then have, in Raz's terminology, a complete reason to carry an umbrella which is made up of this operative
reason toget her with an auxiliary reason, namely the fact that it will rain
today. The weight of this complete reason, again from the perspective of
the objective balance of reasons, is wholly determined by the strength of
my desire not to get wet. Assume further that my only reason not to
39. Fo r the moment I a m ass uming that on ly first-order reasons a re in pl ay. W ha t happens
wh en second- orde r reasons ent er th e pict ure wil l be di sc ussed infra in te xt accompan yin g notes 44-

5!.
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carry an umbrella is the inconvenience of doing so, but that my desires
and interests are such that this reason is outweighed by the complete
reason just described. According to the objective balance of reasons,
then, I should carry an umbrell a today. Now, on Raz's understanding of
practical reasoning I wiil , in deciding what to do, either assume that it
will rain today or I will assume that it will not. If I assume that it will
r.ain, my subjective deterrnination of v;hat ought to be don~ will simr:ly
track the inferential steps and 'Neighing processes of the objective bai2nc.::
of reasons (supposing, that is, that I make no mistakes, which in this case
seems unlikely) and I \vill tb.erefore reach the correct practical conch;.sion that I should carry an umb re lla. If I assume that it will not rain
today, then I will decide what to do on the basis of a belief that I have no
reason to carry an umbrella, and the inconvenience of carrying an
umbrella will prevail in my subjective practical determination. I will
conclude (wrongly as it happens) that I should not carry an umbrella.
Later in the day, when the skies open and I am drenched to the skin, I
might cite my mistaken belief as the explanation for why I acted contrary
to the objective balance of reasons.

3.

Subjective Practical Determinations and Uncertainty

Let me now develop the example described in the preceding section
further by supposing that the meteorology service has announced on the
radio that there is a 20% chance that it will rain today. Notice first that
the statement " The chance that it will rain today (which is 20%) is a
reason to carry an umbrella" could well be true. It cannot, however, be
analyzed in the same way that Raz analyzes the statement "The
probability that it will rain is a reason to carry an umbrella," namely as
asserting that there is a reason to believe that it will rain and that the fact
that it will rain is a reason to carry an umbrella, since a 20% chance of
rain is not a reason to believe that it will rain. It may, however, still be a
reason to carry an umbrella. lt is not part of the argument here that the
statement "There is a 20% chance of rain today" cannot be unpacked
into a complex factual statement which does not mention thi ngs li ke
"chances." Nor is it part of the argument to claim that the compiex fact
associated with that unpacked statement, which will be referred to as fact
A, cannot be regarded as a reason for carrying an umbrella. (Fact A
would be something like the fact that it will rain on about 20 out of 100
days with weather conditions that are similar in certain specified respects
to those prevailing today.) But nothing very important seems to turn on
whether we refer to my belief that there is a 20% chance of rain, to the
fact that there is a 20% chance of rain, or to fact A as my reason to carry
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an umbrella. C onsider that our m eteorological theory migh t not have
been capable of specifying a num erically precise probability of rain , but
only that there is, say, a relati vel y low chance of rai n. h wou ld then be
much more difficult to come up with an analogue to fac t A , and in an y
event the reason which most people would natura ll y cite for carrying an
umbrella would be their beli ef that there is a chance of Ta in, or t.he "fa.ct"
that it "might" rain.
The point to be emphasized abou t this example is uv:: foliow in g:
although from th e perspective of the objective baiance of re21.3ons it is
only th~;; fact that it wil l rai n today w hich gives m e a reason to carry an
umbrella/' 0 I do not decide what to do by first assuming that it will rain
today or else fi rst assuming that it will not. The fact of the n1atter is tha t
I do not know w hether it will rain today, and I take t ha t uncert ainty
d irectly into accou nt in de termining what I ought to do . I treat some
other fact o r belief as a kind of surrogate reason, even though I know
that fact A, say, could never figure in the objective ba lance of reasons. If
I definitely knew, for example, that it is going to rain today , then the fact
that it will rain wo uld be my reason for carrying an umb rella, not fact A .
If, on the other hand , I knew that it is not going to rain today then
neither A nor any other fact would be a reason for m e to carry an
umbrella. As it happens, though, I do not know whether it will rain,
although I have reason to believe that a dry day is more likely than a wet
one. My strategy in the face of this uncertainty is to act as though I have
a reason to carry an umbrella, although I will probably discount its
weight to reflect the perceived likelihood that it will not rain . I n other
words, I will probably treat fact A as having a lower weigh t than I v;ou1d
assign to the fact that it is going to rain today, if I knew that it w as
indeed going to rain. T he reason for carrying an umbrella which I shall
in fact take into consideration will thus be more easily outweighed by the
inconvenience of carry ing an umbrella than would the fa ct that it will
rain, were 1 in a position to treat that fact as a reason .
This rather laboriously developed example illustrates th at und er
conditions of uncertainty, i.e., in circumstances where we have reason in
advance to th ink that we do not kno w what the objective ba lance of reasons requires, we consciously depart in our practica l reasoni ng from the
way that we know we would reason if the objective balance of reasons
were accessible. Our subjective determination of wh at ought to be done
takes into direct account, and our practical conclusions a re par tially
40. I am ass uming that the sen tence "It will rain today " can never be neither true nor false.
E ith er it is true on a given day , or the sentence "It will not rain today" is tru e.
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determi ned by, the fact and extent of our uncertainty about the truth of
propositions which state that the facts which could figure in the objective
balance of reasons obtain (or do not obtain). T his is exactly what Raz's
conception of practical reasoning seems to deny. We reason abo ut what
ought to be done relative to a set of beliefs-in the example, a general
meteorological theory- which we sometimes kn ow, at the time that we
are delib.::rating, to be incomplete or only partially accurate. It is the
incompleteness or possible inaccuracy of our beliefs about meteorology
that creates unce rtainty about th e truth of such propositions as "It will
rain today. " h is , moreover, only relative to this set of beliefs that I
could be said in the example to treat fac t A as a reason for ac tion. If we
held a rnore accurate or more com plete set of beliefs about meteorology
then I could not be regarded as treating fact A but only some other complex fact as my reason for action. 4 1 T he point here is not that I would
necessarily come to think that this new fact obtains and A does not, since
it is possible that both might obtain. The point is, rather, that it is only
because we hold the beliefs that we do, and because we know that those
beliefs are incomplete or only partially accurate, that I could be said to
treat either of these facts as a reason at all, since I know that neither of
them is a reason which could figure in the objective balance of reasons.
T here is thus a sense in which, even for what Raz calls guiding purposes as opposed to explanatory purposes, beliefs have priority over facts
in practical reasoning. T his is so, moreover, even though Raz is
undoubtedly correct when he says that the notion of a reason understood
as a fact is more fund amental than t he notion of a reason understood as a
belief, since it is only reasons in the former sense which can provide the
ultimate justification for any action . It is also the case, of course, that
our subjective determination of what ought to be done always strives (or
at least should strive) to reproduce the result, if not necessarily the supporting reasoning, of the objective balance of reasons. However, it does
not follo v; from the premise tha t the idea of a reason understood as a fact
is the most fundamental notion of a reason that only such reasons are
" normatively significant," or that only they "determine what ought to be
4 1. A more acc urat e me tero logical th eory wo uld tell us that on days with weather conditions
si milar to those prevai lin g toda y, where wh a t co nstitutes "similar con diti ons" would no w be d etermined diffe rent ly fro m befor e, th e cha nce o f rain is somethin g oth e r than 20%; it wo uld tell us that
th e chance of rain is high er if toda y is in fa ct a day wh en it will ra in, o r that it is lower if today wi ll
turn out to be rai n-free. A differe nt compl ex fact from A would be assoc iat ed with thi s new s ta tement of probabilit y, and it is onl y that different fact a nd not A whi ch I could be sa id to be treatin g as
a reaso n fo r ac tio n. I wo uld of co urse now weight m y reason for carrying a n umbrella differently
from the way that I wou ld have we ighted A, in order to reflect th e different view concerning the
probability of rain.

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

926

[Vol. 62:913

done. " 42 Beliefs come to take on a certain life of their own in practical
reasoning, since not only do we not always know -;,vhat the objective balance of reasons requires, but often we knovv that we do not know this at
the very time that we must decide what to do. An adequate theory of
practical reason ing must the refore not suppose that agents always deliberate about what to do on the assumption that their reasoning is tracking
the objective balance of reasons, but must also have something to say
about those situations where agents know that this is not the case.
Raz's conce ption of practical reasoning, according to vvhich reasons
are to be understood only as facts and agents are to be regarded as reaching their practical conclusions on the basis of definite assumptions about
w hether those facts obtain, is thus inadequate. Cont rary to what Raz's
conception implies, agents often consider in their subjective practical
determinations the fact and extent of their own uncertainty about the
truth of propositions which state that facts of the type that could serve as
objective reasons obtain (or do not obtain). Sometimes, as in the example
discussed above, this involves acting as though one has a reason to do
something even though on balance there are insufficient grounds to
believe that one has a reason in the objective sense, since one is not certain that one does not have such a reason. Sometimes, by contrast,
agents take account of the fact that they couid be mistaken about the
state of affairs in question even where they have sufficient grounds to
believe: that the fact that could serve as an objective reason does obtain.
In a criminal trial, for example, the court only has reason, so far as the
objective balance of reasons is concerned, to convict and punish the
accused if the person in fact committed the offense with which he or she
has been charged. A preponderance of evidence that falls short of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt may well be enough to justify a belief that the
accused is guilty, but because of the possibility of mistake, together with
a moral judgment that it is better to acquit guilty persons than to convict
innocent ones, the court will not convict unless the evidence proffered by
the state meets the stricter standard . T his higher burden of persuasion is
one aspect of the presumption of innocence, and, as Raz himself notes, it
is a feature of many presumptions that they serve to sever what he calls
"the normal connection between belief and action. " 43
It is obvious that there are many ways in which agents might take
account in their practical reasoning of uncertainty about what the objective balance of reasons requires. It will not be possible to explore this
42.
4J.

J. RAZ, supra note I, at 18.
J. RAZ, supra note 6, at 10.

J
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topic in its full generality here. Instead, Raz's anal ysis of the concept of
legitimate authority will be examin ed . As the following discussion will
establish, his explanation of why it could ever be rational to act on an
authoritative directive is, in effect, an exposition of one possible strategy
for dealing with the sort of uncertainty tha t has just been considered.
This fact is somewhat obscured, however, by an ambiguity in his notion
of an exclusionary reason.
PRACTICAL REASONING AND UNCERTAINTY:
THE EXAM PLE OF AUTHOR ITY

1.

Two Conceptions of an Exclusionary Reason

Raz maintains, as we have seen, that to fo llow an authoritative
directive is to act on an exclusionary reason. If this is true, then the
nature of the exclusionary reason involved is very different from that of
some of the reasons he refers to as exclusionary in other contexts. To see
how and why this is so, it will be helpful to contrast his analysis of the
concept of promising with his analysis of legitimate authority. Raz says
that any promising principle which looks upon a promise as an expression of an intention to undertake an obligation should be thought of as an
exclusionary rule that is justified only if the creation of a certain kind of
special relationship between persons is held to be valuable:
[Such] principles present promises as creating a relation between the
promisor and promisee-which is taken out of the general competition
of conflicting reasons. It creates a special bond, binding the promisor
to be, in the matter of the promise, partial to the promisee. It obliges
the promisor to regard the claim of the promisee as not just one of
many claims that every person has for his respect and help but as having peremptory force. Hence [such] principles can only be justified if
the creation of such special relationships between people is held to be
valuable. 44

Raz thinks that this kind of promising rule, together with the fact of
having made a promise, gives rise to a reason for not acting on one or
more first- order reasons that the promisor does in fac t have. What a
promise does, in other words, is to preempt at least some of the reasons
that figure in (or at least would otherwise figure in) the objective balance
of reasons. The effect of an exclusionary reason of the sort exemplified
by a promise is to alter the topography of one's objective reasons, so to
speak. There will be at least some situations, therefore, in which one
44.

Raz. supra note 5, at 227-28.
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should behave differently from how one ought to have behaved if one had
not made the promise.
Contrast this with Raz's analysis of authority , -.,,vhich says th?,L a
person who is subject to a directive issued by a legitim ate authorit y ought
not to act on his or her judgment of what the objective balance of reasons
requires (or, as Raz sometimes puts it, on his or her judgment of 1ahat
ought to be don e according to right reason). T his of co11 rse ent ails that
the person does not in any direct sense act on the obj ective reasons them selves, bu t those "excluded" reasons nonetheless do not simpl y drop out
of the practical picture in the way that su pposedly happens in the pro m~
ising case. Authoritati ve directives are meant to be based upon and to
reflect de pendent reasons, i.e., reasons which ap ply to the subjecr in the
circumstances in question. According to Raz's normal justification thesis, a subject is justified in accepting directives from a legitimate authority precisely because the subject is " likely better to comply v.;ith" those
reasons than if he or she tried to follow them "directly . " 45 Thus a person
who follows a d irective which does successfully reflect dependent reasons
is complying with the supposedly excluded reasons even though not
" directly" acting upon them. Once one accepts a directive, one ought
not in addition to attempt to take direct account of the underl ying dependent reasons for the simple and obvious reason that that would be
double-counting. 46 Those reasons have already been taken into consideration , albeit indirectly, just by virtue of the directive having been followed. (This is true even if the directive, which we are assuming was
issued by a legiti mate authority, does not in fact reflect the depende nt
reaso ns, so long as it was intended to do so.47 ) A ut horitative directives
thus do not in any ultimate sense exclude acting upon reasons which
figure in the objective balance of reasons, and indeed their very role is to
try to bring abo ut a greater degree of compliance with those reasons.
T he point of Raz's analysis of authority is simply to determine whose
judgment about wha t the objective balance of reasons requires should
prevail in a given ty pe of situation.
Raz thus has two different conceptions of an exclusionary reason.
The first, wh ich will be referred to as the objective conception, is concerned with reasons not to act on a reason that figures (or at least would
otherwise figure) in the objective balance of reasons. 48 The second,
J. RAZ, supra note 6, at 53.
!d. at 58.
47. !d. at 61.
48 . Should we say that the "exclu ded" reason still figures in the objec tive balance of reasons,
but th a t the agent is not to act upo n it? Or should we say, rath er, that th e: objecti ve ba lance of
45.

46.
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·which will be referred to as the subjective conception, is concerned with
reasons not to act on one's (present) judgment of what an objective reason requires (i.e., on one's judgment of what action the reason calls for
and vvhat weight it shou ld be treated as having). 4 9 The first kind of reason has an effect on what one o ug ht to do (that is to say, it has an effect
on right r,~aso n itself), while the second simply affects how one ought to
go about ens uring that one does what one o ug ht to do. In the context of
R az's anal ysis of authority it only makes sense to rely on a subjective
exclusionary reason if there exists anoth er person (who might in fact be
oneself at an r:;arlier time) whose practical judgment is more dependable
th an one's own. Agents can thus only ap preciate that they have this sort
of reason if they knmv that their own judgment about what the objective
balance of reasons requires is, com pared to the judgment of that other
person, relat ively untrustwor thy . T hey might be aware, for example,
th at the other is wiser than they are, that the other is less likely to be
influenced by irrelevant considerations, or that the other's actions are
capable of affecting the objective balance of reasons itself.5° But
whatever the basis of thei r knowledge might be, agents can only regard it
as rational to follow another's directives if they realize that they themselves might not know what the objective balance of reasons requires in a
particular type of situation. T his phenomenon can be termed practical
uncertainty. From the point of view of the agent, then, reliance on subjective exclusionary reasons can only be justified, at least so far as Raz's
normal m ethod of justifying authority is concerned, if it constitutes a
sensible strategy for dealing with the agent's own practical uncertainty.
An agent who acts on an objective exclusionary reason can sensibly
assume that his subjective practical determ ination is directly tracking the
reaso ns has been altered. in th e sense that th e supposedly excluded reason is now no longer an
objec tive reason a t a!J? Th e seco nd formula ti on has th e greater intuitive appeal , and ind eed it is not
obv io us th at th e firs t even makes much se nse. It is o nl y if the first formu la tion is accepted, however,
that it seems plausib le to speak of mo ra l dut ies as excl usionary reasons. (O n th e stat us of moral
du ti es as r-oasons, see infra note 49.) Taken to ge th er , these points sugges t that the objective conception of an exclusionary reason may not be cohere nt. Since, however, I shall be concerned almost
exclusively in this Pape r with subjective second- ord er reasons, I shall not pursue thi s line of argum ent further.
49. I shall not a tt empt to d raw up a n ex ha usti ve classifi cation which so rts all of th e reason s
that Raz labe ls as ··exc lusi ona ry"' into one or the o ther of those tw o categories. A few furth er
exam ples may be he lpful, however. Raz says that mo ra l duties a re exclusionary reaso ns, supra note
27, a nd if this is so the n they clearly fall under th e objec tive concept ion . F ollowing advice and actin g
on a decis ion , on the ot her hand, must be und erstood in terms of the subjecti ve co nce ption. T he
latter example is an instance of a reason to ac t on one's previous assessment of the bala nce of reasons
rather than o n one"s presen! assessment.
SO. S ee supra notes 22 . 23; see also infra no te 5 I and accompanyi ng text (con cern in g the poss ibil ity that auth oriti es ca n affect the object ive bala nce of reason s).
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objective balance of reasons, as that balance has been modified by the
existence of the exclusionary reason itself. But an agent who acts on an
authoritative directive, which is a subj ecti ve exclusionary reason, cannot
make this assumption. He will no doubt hope that his conduct will comply with the objective balance of reasons, but he will be aware that he is
fo llowing an indirect strategy to achieve that end. Now it is of course
true t hat the issuing of an autho ritative directive is a fact. Further, if the
authority is legitimate then it is also a fact th at agents are likely better to
comply with the object ive balance of reasons by acti ng on the directive
instead of on their ow n judgment. But these are not facts which enter
into the obj ective balance of reasons; neither are they facts which, in the
manner of an objective exclus ionary reason, affect it. An agent treats
these facts as reaso ns, but does so in the way that the agent in our earlier
example treated fact A as a reason to carry an umbrella; they are a kind
of surrogate reason, only to be treated as reasons because the agent is in a
situation of practical uncertainty.
Raz says that an authoritative directive is a first-order reason as well
as an exclusionary reason, but because it is not a reason which figures in
the objective balance of reasons this is somewhat misleading. It is preferable simply to speak of the agent as having a reason, arising out of practical uncertainty, to make his or her subjective determination of what to
do by deferring to another's judgment about what the objective balance
of reasons requires. It should also be noted that while subjective exclusionary reasons differ from objective exclusionary reasons in that they do
not by their nature automatically affect the objective balance of reasons,
it is sometimes the case that other features of an authoritative directive,
or of the circumstances under which the directive is iss ued, can have this
consequence. This is the case, for example, with respect to authoritative
directives which resolve prisoner's dilemma-type situations. 51
There is th us a certain tension between Raz's analysis of the concept
of au thority and the understanding of practical reasoning that he
advanced in Practical Reason and Norms. This tension does not undermine his analysis of authority, which is essentially sound, although it
does provide further evidence that the understanding of practical reasoning which he defended in his earlier work is inadequate, or at least
incomplete. The main object in bringing this tension to light is not to
5 1. Raz di sc usses this and mh er exa mpl es o f
been c:tllin g the objecti ve balance of reasons in J.
cases ex is t that he concludes that the no difference
ity sho uld make no difference to what its subjects

situations in which a utho rities affec t what I ha ve
R AZ, supra no te 6, a t 48-51. It is because s uc h
thesis . which asserts that "the exercise of authorought to do,'" is false. !d. at 48.
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cnticlze Raz's analysis of authority, but rather to cla rify it. Once it is
realized th at th e analysis utili zes the subjective conception of an exclu sionary reason and that at its heart lies a stra tegy fo r dealing with practicai uncertainty , then several refinements to the anal ysis begin to suggest
th emselves. T he nature of these refi nements , w hich are concerned with
certain wa ys in which even legitimate authority can be li mited, is the
su bject of Sec ti ons 3-6 below .

2.

The Bounds of Authority: Ju risdictional and Scope Limitations

Raz's analysis of a uthority builds u po n one particular form of justification for the con clusion that one pers on o r instit uti on o ugh t to defer to
the judgment of a nother person or institution abou t what t he former
ought to do. 52 It will hardly be disputed that deferring to the judgm ent
of a noth er person is at least sometimes th e most rational course, a nd, as
wi ll be shown later, there is more than one way in whic h deference to t he
judgment of a not her can be justified. T he difficult questions, to be d ealt
with initially in this and the immediately following sections, concern t he
determ ination of the limits of deference . For the time being attention
will be focused mainly on deference that is taken to be justified in the
manner indicated by Raz's normal justification thesis. Before considering the possible refinements on the ways that authority can be limited
th a t were m entioned above, it will be hel pful to outline briefly t he two
forms of limitation on legitimate authority w hich are u neq uivocally
accepted by Raz .
Raz says correctly that the directives of legitimate authorities must
at least sometimes be binding even when mistaken , since otherwise "the
ad vantage gained by accepting the a uth ori ty as a more rel iable and successful guid e to r ight reason wou ld d isap pear. " 5 3 But, as was noted ea r lie r , Raz also accepts that authority can be limi ted in at least two ways . 54
F irst of all , a n authority can be limited by th e kinds of acts or situations
which it can or cannot regulate. This is simpiy to say that its jurisdiction
can be circumscribed. · Secondly, authori ties can be limited by the kinds
of reaso ns u pon which they m a y or ma y not re ly and which thei r decisions wi ll preempt. T o put this point in the special terminology developed b y Raz, exclusionary reasons may be limited in scope-they may
exclude some reasons only. It is of course the subjective conception of an
52 . Fo r the sak e of con ven ien ce I sha ll henc eforth use th e word "person·· to refer to bo th
perso ns an d institution s.
53. J. RA Z., supra not e 6, at 6 1; see also id. at 47-48.
54. See supra note 26.
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exclusionary reason which concerns us here. Thus the point could be
expressed more precisel y by saying th at an authoritative directive may
provide a reason no t to act on one's judgment of what is required by only
some, and not necessarily all, of the reasons that fi gure in the objective
balance of reasons.
3.

The Bou nds of Authority: .Reweighting L im itations

The re are at least two othe r ways in which defe ren c.::; i: o an au th ority
could in principle be li mited . T hese will be discussed in t um in this and
th.e fo llowing section . T he first is th e possibility th c:tt I rn ight take the
judgment of the authority in to account only to the extent of introducing
an element of systematic bias into my practical reasoning; l would treat
the case for the conclusion which is favored by the authority as being
stronger to some specified degree than it actually appears to me to be. I
would thus be deferring to the judgment of the autho rity onl y partially,
in the sense that I would never permit my own judgment to be preempted
completely by that of the authority. R az discusses the possibi lity of this
ki nd of pa rtial deference but rejects it as not being compatible with the
general thrust of the normal justification thesis: the reason for deferring
to an authority is to increase the extent to which one com plies with the
reaso ns that apply to oneself, and one will always do better if one defers
to the au thority's judgment completely (within the bounds, of course,
that are set by those other limitations on authority which R az does
accept).5 5
It is not absolutely obvious that R az's observation about this kind of
part ial deference is true, but for present purposes it will be a.ssumed that
he is right. It is nonetheless worth taking note of two further poin ts.
F irst, the idea of such partial deference implicitly presu pposes a generalization of the subjective conception of an excl usionary reason. According to this generalization, a subjective second- order reason is a reason to
treat a reason as having a greater or lesser weight than the agent would
otherwise judge it to possess in his or her subjective determination of
what the obj ective balance of reasons requires.56 (An exclusionary reason is then just the special case of a reason to treat a reason as having
zero weight.) Second-order reasons as thus defined will be referred to as
reweigh ting reasons. Notice that the idea of a reweighting reason only
J. R AZ , supra note 6, at 67-69.
I d iscuss th is gen era lized con cep ti o n of a second- ord er reason in P erry. J udicia! Ob!iga lion. Precedent and 1he Common Law , 7 OX FO RD J. LEGA L STUD. 2 15, 22 2-23 ( 1987). I did no t,
however , d isti ngu ish t he re betwee n s ubjective an d objecti ve seco nd - ord er rea so ns.
55.
56.
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seems to make sense if it is regarded as a possible strategy upon which
agents might rely in their subjective practical determinations about what
ought to be d one. (Whether follo wing such a strategy could ever be justified is, of course, another matter.) The idea that reweighting could take
place at the level of the objective balance of reasons does not even seem
to be coherent, so that a generalization of the sort being discussed is possible with respect only to the subjective and not the objective conception
57
o ;l_J0 I.0·n
. - •
O rl an "' YC1US1,0 " ;-H'\ .' ~.,_..
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The second point is that while Raz may be correct to say that the
idea of reweigh'iing has no possible application where deference to the
practical judgrnerrt of another is to be justified by means of the normal
justification thesi:;, the idea is nonetheless coherent in its own terms, at
least if it is understood in the way just outlined. Quite possibly it could
have an application in other contexts. It might well be of assistance, for
example, in elucidating the role in practical reasoning of certain kinds of
presumptions, such as the presumption of innocence and the presumption of death , which call for an increase (or decrease) in the strength of
the evidence that will be deemed necessary (or sufficient) to justify certain actions. As mentioned earlier, reliance on this kind of presumption
represents one possible strategy for dealing with uncertainty about what
the objective balance of reasons requires, and it is conceivable that that
strategy is most appropriately characterized by reference to the idea of
reweighting. 58 The analysis of such presumptions will not be undertaken
here. It will be suggested below, however, that reweighting reasons have
a role to play in the explication of the common law doctrine of precedent,
which is itself a judicial response to uncertainty about what the objective
balance of reasons requi res.

4.

The Bounds of A uthority: Epistemic L imitations

There is another way in which deference to the practical judgment
of an authority can be limited in addition to the ways that have already
been discussed. This kind of limitation is not completely distinct from
jurisdictional limitations, since it provides what amounts to a means by
which these can be implemented. But it is also capable of limiting deference to the judgment of an authority even where the latter has not
57. The objective conception of an exclusionary reason may not itself be coherent See supra
note 48.
58. There is a brief discussion of presumptions in J. RAZ, supra note 6, at 8-11. The analysis
suggested in the text ap pe ars to be consistent with what Raz says there, as well with the account of
presumptions advanced in Ullmann-Margalit, On Presumption, 80 J. PHIL 143 (1983).
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exceeded the constraints of jurisdiction or scope. The key to this particular variety of limitation is the fact that Raz's analysis of legitimate
a uthority dfectively treats the practice of follo wing authoritative directives as a strategy for dealing with practical uncertainty. While it is true
that an authority's directives must sometimes be binding even when
wrong if the authority is effectively to serve its purpose, there will ordinarily be no reason, fr orn. the perspective of the strategy just described, to
follmv a d irective in a particul a r case if one is certain beyond doubt that
the autho rity has made a mistake. (This is not to say that there might
not be other reasons to foll ow the directive, but a person who acted on
any of those reasons V/Ol.lld not be treating the directive as authoritative
in Raz 's sense.) Uncert ainty is a matter of degree, however. If it is con ceded that an a uthority's directive might not bind an individual who is
certain beyond doubt tha t the authority is wrong, then the possibility
emerges of drawing the epistemic line which is associated with this kind
of limitation at a different point. For example, a person might defer to
the judgment of an authority only where she was so uncertain about the
practical question in hand that she had no opinion one way or the other
on what the appropriate solution should be. Alternatively, she might
d efer no m atter how strongly she felt that the authority had made a mistake. Between these two extremes lies a range of further possibilities
which are defined by the strength of the person's conviction that she is
right and the authority wrong.
Limitations of the sort just described will be referred to as epistemic
limitations on the deference which one person should show to the practical judgment of another. The point at which the former should (for
whatever reason or combination of reasons) cease to defer to the judgment of the latter wi th respect to a given type of practical situation,
·where that point is to be defined by the strength of the former's conviction that the latter has made a mistake, will be termed the epistemic
threshold for those persons and that ty pe of situation . Raz recognizes the
possibility of ep istemic limitations when he says, in response to a possible
objection to his account of authority, that even if legitimate authority is
limited by the condition that its directives are not binding if clearly
wrong, it will still be possible for it to play its mediating role because a
demonstration that something is clearly wrong " does not require going
through the underlying reasoning ." 5 9
N ow the central case of a clear mistake has two features: (1) its
nature is such that it is relatively easy to di scover that a mistake has
59.

J. RAZ, supra note 6, at 62 .
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possibly been made; and (2) once that possibility has come to light the
alleged mistake will be known to be a mistake with some degree of certainty. It is because of the second feature that the type of limitation
which Raz is discussing is an epistemic limitation, or at least incorporates such a limitation. Raz declines to say whether he thi nks legitimate
authorities are in fact limited by the cond ition that their directives are
not bind ing if clearly wrong, but he is nonetheless correct to conclud.:::
that an au thority which was thu s li mited would in principle still be able
to fulfill the mediating role which he assigns to a uthority in general. This
is not because it would be unnecessary to go through the underlying reasoning at all, but because it would be un necessary to go through it in its
entirety. The identification of a clear mistake wo uld seem to demand at
leas t some familiarity with the underlying reasoning, but the fact that an
agent is not completely ignorant of the relevan t first-order reasons still
leaves room for the normal justification thesis to operate.
Mistakes in practical reasoning can be clear mistakes to a greater or
Jesser degree, and there can be variations in degree with respect to each
of the two features of a clear mistake m en tion ed above. Thus the possibility of a mistake might be relatively easy to detect, but one might still
be rather uncertain about whether a mistake had in fact been committed.
Conversely, the possibility of a mistake might be very hard to detect, but
one might be absolutely certain, once that possibility had come to light,
that a mistake had indeed been made. Epistemic limitations are defined
solely in terms of the relative degree of certainty that a mistake has been
m ade, and hence without reference to the relative ease of detecting the
possibility of a mistake.
Conceivably, there could be situations where someone who was less
familiar with the underlying reasoning than an all eged authority cou ld
find it relatively easy to discover the possibiiity of a mistake wi thout in
the majority of cases necessarily being convinced to a ny strong degree
that a mistake had in fact been committed. Given that the person is
assumed to be less familiar with the underlying reasoning than the
authority, there is room for the normal justification thesis to operate.
But there is no a priori reason to th ink that such a person wil l necessaril y
do better, in the sense of complying with right reason to the greatest
possib le extent, by ceasing to defer at a relatively high rather than at a
relatively low epistemic threshold. It is theoretically possible that one
might maximize compliance with right reason if one were to cease to
defer to the judgment of the authority at the point at which one was, say ,
fairly sure that a mistake had been made, rather than at the point of
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complete certainty. This might be true, for example, if one had reason to
think that the authority was only moderately better than oneself at
assessing the objective balance of reasons and if it sometimes displayed a
certain erratic quality in its pract ical determinations. R az' s anai ysis of
legitimate authority is thus compatible with the idea that th e normal justifi caticm thesis itself could place variable li mits (in addi tion to the limits
of jurisdiction and scope) on the degre.:: to which deference should be
shown to the practical judgment of authorities. Kt cmdd justify the
acceptance of epistemic thresholds that differed fro m person to person,
situation to situation, and authority to authority .
5.

Epistemic Limitations and Jurisdiction: The Example of
Adm inistrative Law

As mentioned, epistemic limitations can apply to jurisdictional as
well as to substantive mistakes . Reliance on an epistemic limitation can
in fact tend to blur the distinction between these types of errors, or at
least make it unnecessary to draw a sharp line between them. This fact
could strengthen the case for using epistemic limitations if there are
independent difficulties with drawing the substantive/jurisdictional distinction in a clear and nonarbitrary way. Courts have encountered suc h
difficulties in the area of judicial review of administrative action, and it
will be argued that the result has been a trend towards adopting epistemic limitations to define the character and extent of the deference which
courts should show to the decisions of public tribunals. I n considering
this example, it will help to shed some light on the modifications to Raz's
account of authority which the recognition of epistemic limitations
requires if one bears in mind his claim that the cogency of that account
depen ds on the existence of a relatively clear distinction between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional errors. 60 As we shall see, the introduction of
epistemic limitations calls that claim into question.
In the area of administrative law the basic justification which is usually given for setting up a specialized public tribunal is the opportunity
this creates for the members of the tribunal to draw upon or to develop
an expertise in a relatively limited field. 61 T he existence of such expertise
will make it more likely that the tribunal can be shown, in accordance
with Raz's normal justification thesis, to have legitimate authority over
the individuals who appear before it. If the tribunal's expertise is greater
than that of the court in certain matters, then that will be a reason for the
60.
61.

!d.
P. CRAIG,

ADMlNlSTRATIVE LAW

337 , 339, 343 (19 83).
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court to defer to t he tribunal's judgment, at least where those m at ters are
concerned, wh en th e court is asked by an aggrieved individ ua i to engage
in judicial revie'N. (Effici ency concerns migh t be a re lated, reinforcing
consideration if the tribunal were able to render decisions m ore exped itio usly t han the court.) T he question then is whe ther and how that deference sh ould be limited. One p la usible-sound in g answer is to sr;, y th at
th-:: court should not defer to the tribunal's j udgmen t where the error is
jurisd:ic tional b ut should defer whe re the er ror is no njmisdicti onal (i.e. ,
sLJostantive) .
As studen ts of admini strati ve law are avv are, drawing a d istinc tion
th:tvveen those errors of a public tribunal which go to jurisdiction and
th ose which go to the meri ts of matters falling wi th in the tribunal's
authority is no easy matter . Indeed it is a task t hat it may not even make
a great deal of sense to undertake. P aul Craig has pointed out that grants
of au thority to tribunals can al ways be expressed as follows : if X exists
then th e trib unal may or sh all do Y, where X can consist of a combination of legal, factual, or discretionary elements. 6 2 T he determination of
wheth er or not X exists, which may well be the most important question
faci ng the tribunal, has never been held by the courts to be entirely a
matter of jurisdiction. 63 T he collateral fact doctrine is one well-known
effort to keep judicial review of administrative action from simply collapsing into appeal on the merits by attempting to distinguish between
those elements within the X factor which condition jurisdiction and
those which do not. It is an effort that has generally been d iscredited
precisely because of the apparent impossibility of d raw ing this ki nd of
distin ction in a nonarbitrary way. 64 A s Craig observes, the critical question in this area of administrative law, an answer to which will underlie
any theo ry of jurisdictional limits, " is whose relative opinion on which
matters should be held to be authoritative. " 6 5 The collateral fact doctrine t ries to answer this question in a way that will steer a middle course
between overly broad and overly narrow review, but " [t] he median is
attained by total control over some topics and no con tro l over oth ers,
\V ith an a rbitrary line betwixt the two. " 66
A n alternative theory of judicial review that tries to steer a different
kind of m iddle course has been gaining widespread acceptan ce in the
62.
63.

64.
65.
66.

Jd
ld
!d .
!d .
!d.

a t 299.
a t 302.
a t 301-04.
a t 315.
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33 5.
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United States, 6 7 Canada, 6 8 and elsewhere, namely the reasonableness o r
ratio nal basi s test. 69 It rejects the attempt of the collateral fact doctrine
to distinguish between jurisdictional and nonjuri sdictional elements
within the X factor. At the same time it also rejects that doc trine's a ll or-noth ing a pproach, according to wh ich a perceived jurisd ictional error
a:J tomaticall y re nders the tribunal 's decision a nullity w hereas, so long 2.s
th ,~re has been no breach of natural justice or other procedural mistake, a
perceived nonjurisdictional error is nonreviewabl e. O n t he rational basis
a pproac h the review ing court will defer to the tribunal's judgment ·.vith
respect to matters within the X factor , even if it thin ks that the trib;;nal
decid ed wrongly, so long as its decision was reasonab le . The ran ge of
\Vhat counts as reaso nabl e will be determined by the court and wi ll vary
depending on the nature of the tribunal and the content of the enabling
legislation. 70 Sometimes the court will apply a correctness test to a particu lar question and simply substitute its own view for that of the tribunal/1 but ordinarily it will only do this where it h as concluded that the
court is in a better position than the tribunal to deal with questions of
that ki nd. 72
The experience of courts in this area of the law thus illustrates that
it can be very difficult to distinguish in a clear and nonarbitrary way
between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional errors. Moreover, the alternative approach which has been widely advocated as a means of addressing this difficulty, namely the rational basis or reasonableness test, is
most plausibly viewed as involving an epistemic limitation on the deference which one person should show to the practical judgment of another.
A j udge who allows the decision of a tribunal which she thi nks was mistake n to stand so long as she is able to regard the decision as reasonable
is deferri ng to the practical judgment of the tri bunal , but only up to a
point. That point is determined mainly by reference to the strength of
the judge's conviction that the tribunal has erred. After all, what else
67.

N LRB v. Hearst Publi ca ti ons, Inc. , 322 U.S. Ill (1944).

68. Canadian Union of Publi c E mployees, Local 963 v. New Brun swick Liqu or C orp., [ 1979] 2
S.C.R 227.
69. P. CRA IG, supra note 61 , a t 338-43.
70. Jd . at 338.
7 i. A correctness test is simply one extreme of a continuum o f possib ili ties perm itt ed by a
rat iona l basis test. Cf id. at 343. Acco rding to Craig,
[w]ht:ther th e diversity [which is possible in th e ex tent of revi ew] is reflec ted in the prese nce
o f two test s, rat iona l basis a nd rightness , or wheth er we should simply wo r k thro ugh the
fo rme r is a mat ter o f semantics . . . If we wo rk thro ugh the fo rm er a lo ne t he ra nge of
c ho ice or th e brea dth of th e spec trum wil l va ry fro m a rea to area. Not o nl y w ill it a lt er b ut
the spectrum might be reduc ed to o ne .
72.

!d. at 343.
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could it mean to say that a person regards a decision as wrong but reasonable than that she believes the decision is mistaken but recognizes
that there is at least a nonneg1igible possibility that she might be wrong
and the tribunal right? An unreasonable decision, on the other hand, is
one which she is convinced to some relatively strong degree of certainty
could not be right. T here may also be a social element involved in the
designation of a mistake as an unreason able one, in the sense that the
judge may have to think that most other people (or most other people
with a certain level of expertise) ·would agree with her judgment. Ho\vever, this would be a condition that was ancillary to the basic requirement that she herself be fairly strongly convin ced that an error had been
committed . As a result, the rational basis or reasonableness test is clearly
best characterized as an approach to judicial review whose effect is to
place an epistemic limitation on t he deference which a reviewing court
should show to the decisions of public tribunals.
We have already seen that there is no unique epistemic threshold
that is automatically determined by the character of a "clear mistake."
Varying the threshold from situation to situation is compatible, moreover, with the normal justification thesis because such variation could
help to maximize overall compliance with right reason (i.e., compliance
with the requirements of the objective balance of reasons). As the above
discussion of the reasonableness test has shown, the range of decisions of
a given tribunal which are to count as reasonable with respect to a given
type of subject matter is itself subject to variation by the courts. In theory, the possibilities range from complete deference to complete lack of
deference (application of a correctness test), and while reviewing courts
seldom adopt the former of these extreme approaches, they do sometimes
adopt the latter. In light of the conclusion that the reasonableness test
has the effect of placing an epistemic limitation on the deference which
courts should show to tribunals, it seems clear that the best interpretation of the judicial practice of varying the range of what is to count as
reasonable is that the courts are applying different epistemic thresholds
to different situations.
The basic standards for determining the existence of a jurisdictional
or substantive error will ordinarily be foun d, of course, in the tribunal's
enabling legislation. Since those standards (and the moral standards
needed to supplement them) can be controversial, the basic question
becomes, to quote Craig once again, "whose relative opinion on which
matters should be held to be authoritative." 73 Using a reasonableness
73.

ld.at315.
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app roach, the most important aspect of any answer to that question will
be the point at which the epistemic threshold is set. T here are a number
of different factors that could infl uence this decision, including most
obviously the desire to maximize compliance with right reason. Taking
this factor into account would requi re an assessment of the relative
degree of expertise in t he relevan t subject matter possessed by the court
and the tribunal respectively, and it is clear enough that courts often do
engage in such assessments. But other considerations could also en ter
into the court's calculations, such as the need for a certain degree of
efficiency in decisionmaking or the fa ct that the tribunal might not be
able to function as a legitimate and independent body if its decisions were
quas hed too frequently. These last two factors also demonstrate that th e
answer to the question of how much one person should defer to the practical judgment of another person is not necessarily determined by the
normal justification thesis alone, even where the latter is a legitimate
authority, in Raz's sen se, for the former.
It is worth emphasizing that the use of epistemic limitations in institu tional contexts is by no means limited to the judicial review of administrative action; it is in fact a common phenomenon. Thus an approach
similar to the rational basis test is often used in many areas of the law
besides administrative law to determine the boundaries between the
authority of one person or body to make a decision and that of another
person or body either to quash the decision of the fir st or to make the
decision itself. It is, for example, a similar kind of reasonableness test,
and one which is also best understood as giving effect to an epistemic
limitation, that courts apply to determine which fin dings of fact are
reviewable on appeal. R eliance on an epistemic limitation also seems to
fo rm part of the English doctrine that a court will not treat as conclusive
a Minister of the Crown's objection to producing a document as evidence
in civi l litigation, but instead will balance t he public interest in withholding the document against the public interest in ensuring the proper
ad ministration of justice.74 On one understanding of this doctrine the
court will defer, but only up to a point which is best regarded as being
defined by an epistemic limitation, to the Minister's assessment of the
strength of the case that can be made for withholding the document. 75
Finally, it is worth noting that an approach to jurisdictional questions
74. See, e.g., Conway v. Rimmer, [1 968) A.C. 910.
75. !d. at 984. Lord Pearce stated :
It is difficult to lay down with precisio n how far th e co urt sho uld accept th e view of the
executive o n what shou ld be privileged whil e re tainin g its inh eren t power to rejec t it; and
how fa r it sho uld inspec t a nd form its ow n views, whil e givin g due wei ght to the Mi ni ster's
objection.
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which is best understood in terms of an epistemic limitation is often
adopted in institutional contexts outside the law. For example, university tenure appeal committees sometimes con sider whether the decision
of an original tenure committee was one tha t could have been arrived at
by reasonable and fair-mi nded people or whether it reflects some manifest error of judgment. If the appeal committee concludes th2.t the original decision was wrong but not manifestly wrong, then it must allow the
deci sion to stand. 76
6.

The Natu re of Epistemic Limitations

W hat effect does the recognition that a legitimate authority might be
const rained by an epistemic limitation and, more particularly, that the
epistemic threshold is not uniquely fixed , have on Raz's analysis of
authority? Beyond the effect on his analysis of a uthority, how does the
notion of an epistemic limitation fit into Raz's more general account of
practical reasoning? T he answer to the first of these questions is: very
little. Even a relatively low epistemic threshold might theoretically be
called for by the normal justification thesis itself, since it is at least conceivable that an agent might maximize compliance with right reason by
not deferring to the authority's judgment past that particular point. In
practice, tho ugh, it might be rational for an agent in this situation to
comply with a somewhat higher threshold simply to avoid expending the
increased costs in time and effort which, due to the need to scrutinize the
underlying reasoning more often and more carefull y, are likely to be the
result of acting in accordance with a lower threshold. 77 Efficiency concerns, which might lead to a tradeoff with the goal of maximizing com pliance with right reason, provide an example of a kind of reason that
can play a part in justifying deference to the practical judgment of
anothe r while also remaining, at least to some extent , independen t of the
normal justification thesis. (Raz states that following authority on efficienc y grounds " is a borderline case between normal and deviant
justification. " 78 )
As wil l be d iscussed below, speaking in terms of "giving weight " to the practical judgment of
another is a natural idiom to empl oy in referring to epistemic limitations.
76.

I owe this example to Th omas Hurka.

77. Cf J. RAZ, supra note 6, at 73 ("One also has to take notice of the disadva ntages to o ne's
life o f too obsessive a preoccupation with quest io ns of th e prec ise limits of a uthorit y."). Raz is
ta lkin g here of scope lim itat ions, but th e same is true of episte mi c limit ations as we ll.
78.

! d. a t 75.
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The second and more important of the two questions posed above is
how exactly does the notion of an epistemic limitation fit into Raz's general account of practical reasoning? Up to this point it has implicitly
been assumed that such limitations are really just constraints on the
applicability of exclusionary reason s. 'W hile this is one possible way to
conceptualize epistemic limit ation s, it vvill be argued that the better
approach is to regard them as givin g rise to a special category of subjective second-order reasons which is to be contrasted with, not included
within, the category of exclusionary reasons. A subjective second- order
reason which always (within appropriate scope and jurisdictional limitations) requires deference to the practical judgment of another person,
even when the agent is convi nced beyond doubt that the other has made
a mistake, may be termed a pure (subjective) exclusionary reason. A subjective second- order reason which requires a person to defer to another's
practical judgment only up to some specified epistemic threshold may
then be referred to as an epistemically-bounded reason. 79 The question
which must now be addressed is whether pure exclusionary reasons and
epistemically-bounded reasons should be regarded as two species of t he
single genus "exclusionary reason," or whether the concept of an exclusionary reason should be limited to pure exclusionary reasons. In the
latter case, exclusionary and epistemically-bounded reasons would be
mutually exclusive categories.
While Raz concedes that a "clear mistake" -type of limitation on
authoritative directives is possible in principle, it is evident that he conceives of exclusionary reasons as pure exclusionary reasons only. The
possibility nonetheless exists of extending the category of exclusionary
reasons thus understood to include epistemically-bounded reasons. The
notion of an exclusionary reason is technical in character, in the sense
that it does not have any precise analogue in popular usage, so any
answer to t he question of whether such an extension should be effected
will to some extent be a matter of linguistic stipulation. But it is sensible
in such cases to let stipulation be guided by the most important or significant aspects of the technical notion in question. Epistemically-bounded
reasons are similar to pure exclusionary reason s in that the agent's judgment is, on any one occasion, either completely preempted by the authority's judgment or it is not. In this respect they both differ from
79. The no ti o n of a n ep istemicall y-bo und ed reason, lik e that of a rewe ighting reason, o nl y
makes se nse if it is rega rd ed as a n insta nce of the s ubj ec tive conceptio n o f an ex clusio nary reaso n. It
operates at the level of an agen t' s subj ecti ve determinations of what to do as part of a st rategy to deal
with practical un ce rtainty. The idea of a n epistemically- bounded objective exclusio nary reason is
incoh erent.
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reweighting reasons. But this feature of pure exclusionary reasons is not
particularly significant. To discover what is fundamental about pure
excl usio nary reasons it is necessary to focus on their purpose.
In Practical Reason and N orms R az argues tha t all mandatory
no rms, which is a category that is clearly to be understood as in cluding
rules a:nd authoritative directives, are exclusi onary reasons . He then proceed::-. to describe the purpose of such norms:
The presen ce of a norm does no t autom at ically settle prac tical
p r ob lems. There may be other conflicting reasons not excluded by the
nor m T here may be scope-affec ting considerations, etc. Bu t it mu st
be adm itted that for the most part the presence of a norm is d ecisive.
T he complicating factors apply only in a min ority of cases. The whole
purpose of havi ng norms is to achieve this sim pl ifi cation. The fact t h at
norms are exclusionary reasons enables them to achieve this purpose
. . . . [N ]orms have a relative independence from the reasons which
justify them. In order to know that the norm is vaiid we must know
that there are reasons which justify it. But we need not know what
t hese reasons are in order to apply the norm correctly to the m ajority
of cases. 80

The whole point of mandatory norms and exclusionary reasons generally
is, therefore , to simplify practical reasoning by isolating the norm or reason from its justifying first- order reasons. Exclusionary reasoning
enables agents to act without the necessity of going through the underlying reasoning themselves, or at least without having to go through it on
each occasion that they act.
Raz recognizes that reliance on exclusionary reasons may occasionally require some familiarity with the underly ing reasoning. T his will be
th e case, for example, with respect to some applications of the scope distinction. Nevertheless, this kind of complication is supposed to be kept
to a minimum. Perhaps Raz might want to say that a "clear mistake"
limitation is a similar kind of minimal complication that does not call for
recognition of a new category of second-order reasons, but there are at
least two difficulties with this idea. The first is that there exists a ra nge of
epistemically-bounded reasons, not just a single kind of minimal limitation which, if applicable at all, applies in all circumstances in the same
way. T he second , related difficulty is that reliance on such reasons
always requires at least some familiarity with the underlying reasoning
80. J. RA Z, supra note 1, at 79; see also id. at 80 ("It is on ly in exceptional circumstances that I
mu st know the precise reasons for the rule in order to know wh a t to do."); cf J. RA Z, supra note 6,
at 58 ( rul es medi a te be twee n deeper level co nside ra ti ons and co nc rete d ec isio ns).
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and will often be compatible w ith, or even demand, a very extensive
familiarity .
W hen a person defers to the practical judgrnent of another on the
basis of the normal justification thesis, the extent of familia rity vvith the
underlying reasoning which that person requires so as to be able to rdy
on an epistemic !imitation will presumably be lower tha n the degree of
fami liarit y possessed by the person being treated as an autho rit y. Tl1is is,
nonetheless, q uite compatible with the form er possessing a significe<.nt
level of expert ise in the relevant area himself. Mo re importantly, defer ence to the j udgrnent of another person can be j ustified on grounds other
than the normal justification thesis, and, where this is so, a fairly exten sive fam iliarity with the underlying reasoning may be crucial if the strat··
egy calling for reliance on an epistemically-bo unded reason is to be
successful. It will be argued below that this is the case with respect to
legal reasoning. Epistemically-bounded reasons as a class thus call for a
fa miliarity with the underlying first-order reasoning which, because it
can be quite extensive, is fundamentally at odds with what Raz views as
the purpose of exclusionary reasons. T hat purpose is, to repeat, the isolation of the underlying reasoning from the agent's own practical deliberations. It is therefore preferable that epistemically--bounded reasons not
be defined as a sub-class of exclusionary reasons, and henceforth the term
"exclusionary reason " will be used to refer to pure exclusionary reasons
only. (As has already been made clear, the exclusionary reasons in question here wi ll always be subjective exclusionary reasons .)
Reweighting reasons and epistemically-bounded reasons are both
categories of subjective second- order reasons which place limits on the
deference that one person should show to the practical judgment of
another. There are, however, several res pects in which they differ. A
reweighting reason introduces a systematic bias in favor of another person's judgment into the agent's own subjective practical determinations,
and, in particular, into the agent's deliberations abo ut how first-order
reasons should be weigh ted. Although the bias is always operative, it
still acts as a limitation on deference because the agent's judgment is
never completely preempted by the judgment of the other person (except,
of course, in the extreme case of an exclusionary reason, which can be
regarded as a special case of a reweighting reason) . By contrast, epistemically-bounded reasons constrain deference by limiting the occasions on
which deference should be shown . W hen the agent does defer, however,
his or her judgment wi ll be preempted completely. Furthermore, reliance on epistemically -bounded reasons is at least sometimes compatible
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with an authority's being legitimate in Raz's sense, I.e. , ·with its being
justified by the normal justification thesis, but, as was noted earlier, the
same may not be true of reliance on reweig hting reasons.
Although there are notable differences between reweig hting reasons
and epistemically-bounded reasons, there are also important similarities.
BcJth can naturally be spoken of as giving iise to a "presumption" in
favor of the practical solution that is being advanced by another person.
Both types of reasons also seem capable of giving a more precise content,
alb-'::i'' in different ways, to the idiom of "attributing weight" to the practical judgment of another. Since the notions of "presumptiveness" and
"attributing weight" often figure prominently in discussions of the legal
doctrine of precedent, it is natural to ask whether either or both of these
t\VO types of second- order reasons have a part to play in the elucidation
of that doctrine. Following a brief ex position of Raz's own positivist theory of law, which is itself b uilt around the idea of a subjective exclusionary reason, it will be argued below that the answer to this question is
"yes." The point of the discussion of reweighting reasons and epistemically-bounded reasons in this and preceding sections has essentially been
just to clarify Raz's conception of a second-order reason and to propose
several relatively minor refinements to his analysis of legitimate au thority. But the suggestion that the doctrine of precedent should be understood in terms of such reasons amounts to more than an analogous
recommendation that Raz's version of positivism be amended in one or
t'NO small respects. It is, rather, one aspect of a comprehensive conception of law and legal practice which offers an alternative to, and in many
respects is incompatible vvith, the theory of law defended by Raz.

II .
A.

1.

PHILOSOPHY OF LAW

RAz's DEFENSE OF LEGAL POSITIVISM

Two Theses

"Legal philosophy is nothing but practical philosoph y applied to
one social institution." 81 In this sentence Raz makes explicit two of the
most im portant general theses which underlie and inform his approach
to the philosophy of law. The first is that law gives rise in a systematic
way to reasons for action, so that legal philosophy must be regarded as a
branch of the philosophy of practical reason. T he second is that legal
phi losophy involves the study of a particular kind of social institution.
I n a sense both of these theses are obvious truisms, but because both have
81.

j. RAZ,

supra note 1, at 149.
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sometimes been ignored by legal philosophers the prominence which R az
gives to them in his writings is salutary. Beyond that, it is by means of a
particular viev.; about the function of law, a view which ultimately
de rives from the second of the two theses and wh ich gives a more con-crete cast to the first, that Raz constructs his very powerfu l defense of
legal positivism. The two theses thus play a more significant role in
R az's legal theory than mereiy drawing attention to a couple of vagu e
and uncontroversial platitudes. Th e second is the co rnerstone of his
basic methodoiogy in legal philosophy, and it will be disc ussed in suffi ..
cien t detail in the follow·ing section to enable us to und erstand whether
and how Raz's approac h differs from the '·Nell know n methodology of
Ronald Dworkin. This will facilitat e a critical comparison of R az's version of positivism with what is essentially a Dworkinian theory of law.
The first of the two theses, on the other hand, is a kind of highly abstract
summary of the importance within Raz's legal theory of his analysis of
authority and of his conception of an exclusionary reason. T his thesis
will be discussed later, when Raz's conception of the function of law is
considered.
2.

lvfethodology: The Institutional Approach

In insisting that legal philosophy must begin with what he calls the
institutional approach Raz explicitly rejects two other possible starting
points, which he terms the linguistic approach and the lawyers' perspective. 82 The second of these builds upon the idea that "[t]he law has to do
with those considerations that it is appropriate for courts to rely upon in
justifying their decisions. " 83 This is clearly just a specific instance of the
institutional ap proach, one which concentrates on a particular type of
legal institution (i.e., courts) . The other possibility Raz considers,
namely the linguistic approach , holds that legal philosophy should concentrate on explicating the meaning of the word "law. " 84 Raz is clearly
correct to reject this approach, and in doing so he makes common ca use
wi th Ronald Dworkin in repudiating what the latter calls "sem antic"
theories of law. 85 Dworkin's own methodology begins with the premise
that legal theorists (and judges) should offer interpretations of legal prac tice as a whole that best justify the practice, which is to say, show it in its
82.
(1983) .

83.

See Ra z, The Problem about th e Nature of Law, 21 U.W.

01'<'TARIO
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203. 204-i2

!d. at 207.
84. Jd. at 204 -07; see also J. RAZ , supra note 3, at 41 ("[W] e do not want to be slaves of
words. "); J. RAZ , T HE CONCEPT OF A L EGA L S YSTEM 209-10 (2d ed. 1980).
85. R . DwoRKIN, LAw's E:YlPIRE 31-33 (19 86).
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best light from the perspective of political moral ity. 86 This methodology
has a dimension of fit, which is shaped by legal practice itself, and a
normative or evaluative dimension, which is shaped by the theorist's
understanding of political morality. 87 It is worth emphasizing that Raz's
methodology bears a distinct resemblance to Dworkin's, since in taking
up the institutional approach he is, li ke Dworkin, concentrating on th e
understanding of certain kinds of existing "social practices" (to use
Dvvorkin's term). 88 Raz also a.c knmvledges that legal theories, including
his own, will involve evaluative judgmen ts , although he denies that such
judgments are necessarily moral in nat ure. 89
This is not to suggest that Raz and Dworkin have any thing like
identical approaches to doing ph ilosophy of law, but their respective
methodologies are at least suffi ciently similar to permit a true joining of
issue between them. Failure to appreciate how and why this is so has led
to some confusion, however, and there are certain misconceptions which
should be corrected. To begin, Dworki n seems to conflate two different
ways in which Raz says that moral considerations do not enter into legal
theory. 90 The first is Raz's claim, discussed above, that legal theory does
not involve moral judgments at a methodological level. The second concerns what Raz calls the sources thesis, which says that individual laws
must be identifiable on the basis of social facts alone and hence in valueneutral terms. 91 Dworkin says that the sources thesis must be argued
for, and that "any plausible argument must be an argument of political
morality or wisdom." 92 T he clear implication is that Raz has not offered
such an argument.
The sources thesis, wh ich rep resents an important step in Raz 's
defense of positivism, will be discussed below. For present purposes it
will suffice to point out that Raz does present an argument in support of
the thesis, and that he frames this argument in terms of a conception of
the "function" of law. T he function he identifies is intended to make
sense of the institutional aspects of law, and as such would seem to
86. See, e.g., id . a t 90.
87. See, e.g., id. at 228-3 8.
88. ! d . a t 50 and passim.
89. Ra z. supra no te 17, at 320 -22 : Raz . supra no te 82, at 217- 18. It should be noted, however,
that in The Concepl of a Legal Syslem, J. RAZ , supra note 84, at 221, Raz refers to hi s co nception of
law as '"po litical." It is also wo rth ment ioning tha t in The Morality of Freedom, J. RA Z, supra no te
6, a t 135 -3 6, he gives the wo rd '"mo ral" " a ··very wide sense in which it is ro ughly equiva lent to
4

Cva luati ve. ' "

90.

91.
92.

R. DwORKIN, supra note 85, at 429-30 n. 3.
See. e.g., J. RAZ, supra nol e .3. a t 39 -40.
R. DwORKI N, supra no te 85, at 430.
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involve essentially the same idea that Dworkin has in mind when the
latter says that any interpretation of a social practice must attribute some
point or purpose to it. 93 M oreover, Raz acknovvledges that the argu ment
fo r the sources thesis involves eva luative judgments, denying only that
t hose judgments are moral. In other words, Raz does have an argument
of very much the sort which Dworkin says he must produce; it is just
that Raz refuses to apply the label "moral" to it. The result is a theory of
law which holds that the identification of individual lavvs must be valuefree, but the theory itself is admittedly defended in evaluative terms. 94
Both Raz and Dworkin thus share the idea that legal theory involves an
attempt to understand the point or funct ion of certain kinds of soci al
institutions (Raz's term) or social prac tices (Dworkin's), where the
at tempt will necessari ly involve adopting an evaluative viewpoint. The
substantive di fferences between their respective theories result from the
fact that they view the functi on of legal institutions in very different
ways. Their major methodological difference, which concerns whether
or not the inevitable evaluative judgments can, as Dworkin claims, be
further characterized as being drawn fro m political morality, is not a
particularly important matter for present purposes. 95
A misconception which looks in the opposite direction is propounded by certain critics of Law's Empire , fo r example Steven Burton,
who think that Dworkin's interpretive approach to legal theory may well
presuppose something like Hart's or Raz's version of positivism. 96 Burton, after first pointing out that Dworkin 's methodology requires a
preinterpretive stage at which legal practice is identified, states that
93. !d. at 58-59. See also R . D wORK IN, A MATITR OF PRI NC IPL E 160-62 (19 85) (h erein after
R. DWORKIN, PRINCIPLE]. In Taking Righ1s Seriously Dworkin speaks express ly of the "fu nction ··
of law , a nd contrasts his vi ew of what th a t function is with what he takes to be th e positivist vi ew.
R. DW OR KIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERI OUSLY 347-4 8 ( rev. ed. 1978) (h ere inaft er R. DW ORK IN,
R IGHTS](discussed in Raz, supra note 17, a t 320). O n the disag reemen t between Ra z a nd Dwo rkin
ove r what the function of law sh o uld be underst ood to be, see infra note 108 .
94. Cf G. POSTEMA, BENTHAM ANO THE COMM ON L AW T RADITI ON 328-32 ( 198 6) (th ere is
no interna l inconsistenc y in Bentham's insis tence, o n norm ative gro und s, t ha t crite ri a of lega l va li d·
ity be res tric ted to a ca no nica l li st o f m o ra ll y neutra l soc ia l fac ts).
95. A lthou gh I shall not try to argue the point here. I think that Dw orki n has th e better of this
dispute. Gerald P ostema has rece ntly offered an appea ling acco unt of meth odology in lega l phil oso·
p hy wh ich is co nsiste nt with thi s concl usio n. See id. a t 328-36. For a n int e res tin g c ritiqu e o f Dworkin 's acco unt of th e interpretat ion of socia l practices see Pos tema, "Proleswnr" In rerprerarion and
Social Pracrices, 7 LAw & PHI L. 283 (1 98 7). For a n exce llen t di sc ussion o f t he gen e ra l thesis that an
adequate theo ry o f the nature of law presupposes some po lit ica l theory and henc e ca nnot be va lu eneutra l see Green , The Political Content of Legal Theory, 17 PHIL. Soc. Sc i. I ( 1987).
96. Burton, Ronald Dworkin and L egal Positivism , 73 IOWA L. R EV. 109 (19 87); see also Hart,
Comm en t, in ISSU ES IN CONTEMPORAR Y L EGAL PHILOSOPHY 34 (R. Gavi son ed. 1987) (replying to
Dworkin' s summ a ry of th e a rgument of L aw's Empire, supra no te 85) .
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"Dwork in 's brief description of the preinterpreti ve stage seems to presuppose a positivist criterion of identity .... " 97 In making thi s claim Bu rton depends heavily on the fact that at one point D workin speaks of the
preinterpretive stage in terms of the identification of " social ru les, " 98 and
indeed Dworkin does som etimes seem to suggest that ident ifying the conten t of legal p ractice is a m atter of discovering various " rules and standards. "99 But the better interpretation of La w's Empz't-c requ in::s us to
take seriously D -.,vorkin 's statement that th eories of la'>v "try to sho\v
legal practice as a whole in its best light," 100 a thesis wh ich he proceed s to
am plify by explaining th at legal practices in our own culture include legislat ures, courts, and ad ministrative agencies. 10 1 D worki n is thus really
saying no more and no less than R az when the latter suggests that legal
theory is a matter of trying to understand the nature of certain kinds of
social institutions, where it is clear t hat what R az has in mind are primarily legislative and adjudicative institutions. 10 2 W hateve r problems
that the identification of such institutions presents for Dworkin, however, and it is certainly not being argued here that there a re no such
problems, exist for Raz as well. 103 Dworkin's interpretive approach to
legal theory does not presuppose a theory such as Raz's. Rather they
both present competing interpretations of roughly the same social
phenomena. 104
97.
98.

Burton , supra not e 96, at 11 8.
R. DWORKIN, supra note 85, at 66.

99. !d. at 65-66.
100. !d . at 90 (emphasis add ed).
10 1. Jd . a t 9 1. That Dwo rkin equivocat es a bo ut the nature of pre interpreti ve d a ta is no t iced in
Kress, The l flle rprelive Tu m (Boo k Review), 97 ETHICS 83 4 , 855 ( 1987).
102. J. R AZ, supra note I, a t 123f passim ; J. RAZ, supra no te 3, at 43, 87- 88.
103. Cf G reen, supra not e 95, at 10 (the determination within Raz's theo ry of which instituti o ns are to be regarded as "co urts" is a complex question, th e a nswer to whi c h depends on the
mo ral status of the instituti ons and / or their ex plan a tory role in und erstandin g po liti cal beha vior) .
104. Ste ven Burto n says th a t R a z and H a rt are engaged in ge ne ra l jurisprudence, w hich he ta kes
to be "the phi loso phi cal effo rt to unders!and law a nd legal sys te ms as abstract co nce pts tran sce ndin g
a ny one contin ge nt, culturally situated, practice.' ' Burton, supra no te 96, at 11 0. This "transc ultural" approac h is contrasted with Dworkin's "intracultural" a pproach to doing juri sprudence. S ee
id. a t 110-13. Cf Kress, supra no te 101, at 841-42. It is true th a t Ra z says that ''it is a criterio n of
ad equacy o f a legal theory tha t it is t rue o f all th e intuiti vely c lea r ins tan ces o f municipa l lega l
sys tems ," J. R AZ, supra not e 3, a t 104, whereas Dwo rkin con ce ntra tes a lmos t exc lusive ly on Ang loAmerican lega l institutions. This is not, how ever, indicative o f a fund a m ental m e thodological di ffe rence of the sort described by Burton. While Ra z is undoubtedly o f the opini on th a t a legal th eo ry
sho uld apply to a broader range of legal systems than thos e to be found in Brit a in a nd the Unit ed
Sta tes , it is no neth eless clear th a t h e thinks of hi s own theory, a t leas t, as bein g fo rmulated in c ulture- spec ifi c te rm s and as foc usin g in the first insta nce o n o ur o wn culture 's legal institution s. See
id . at 50; sup ra no te 17, at 321. (In speakin g of "o ur" culture, Raz probabl y has in mind weste rn
soc ieties genera lly rather than just those of Britain and the Unit ed States, but thi s hardly constitut es
a major point of disagreement with Dworkin.) Cf G. POSTEMA , sup ra note 94, at 335 n.49 ("gen e ra l
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The Function of Law: The Guidance of Conduct

Let us turn, then, to a consideration of the central element in Raz's
defense of legal positivism, namely his conception of the point or func tion of law. Raz maintains that law's function, or at least its main func tion, is to provide "publicly ascertainable ways of guiding behaviour." 105
As he says at one point, "[i]t is of the essence of law to guide behaviour
through rules and courts in charge of their a pplication ." 106 For }laz, this
view of the function of law derives from a particular understanding of the
role of legal institutions in social life. This becomes clear from such
statements as the following: "[The] institution alized aspects of law identify its character as a social type, as a kind of social institution. Put in a
nutshell, it is a system of guidance and adjudication claiming supreme
authority within a certain society . . . . " 107 As has already been suggested, Raz can fairly be regarded as putting forward here a particular
interpretation, in Dworkin's sense of that term, of 'Nhat the latter calls
legal practice. 108
As the last two quotes in the preceding paragraph illustrate, Raz
thinks that adjudicative institutions are a necessary feature of law, and
indeed he maintains that they are a more fundamental aspect of legal
systems than are legislative institutions. 109 But it is important to bear in
mind that the main role that Raz's theory ascribes to what he calls normJurisprudential theory is inevitably local, at least in first approximation"). Postema goes on to say
that "local" "may be understood to embrace an entire legal culture, not just a :,ingle Jurisdiction."
See also R. DwORKIN, supra note 85, at 102-03. It is difficult to see how legal theory could proceed
in any other way than by focusing, at least initially, on a particular legal culture. Attempting to lay
down necessary and sufficient conditions for what is to count as a legal system in a '"transcultural"
sense will inevitably be nothing more than an exercise in definitional stipulation. This is because
there is no way of making a pretheoretical determination of which practices belonging to different
cultures are to count as "legal"' practices in any theoretically interesting sense of ""legal."
105. J. RAZ, supra note 3, at 50-51.
106. !d. at 225 (emphasis added).
!07. !d. at 43.
108. Notice, however, that the point or function which Raz attributes to law is quite different
from that which is ascribed to it by conventionalism, Dworkin's reconstructed version of positivism.
According to Dworkin the point of law is, from the conventionalist perspective, to give the citizen
fair warning of when the state will apply coercion; he thus takes the heart of the conception to be
"'the ideal of protected expectations.·· R. DwoRKIN, supra note 85, at 117. But Raz takes the point
or function of law to be the exclusionary guidance of conduct, not the giving of fair warning. The
goal of not taking people by surprise, which is one aspect of Raz's positivist conception of the rule of
law, is not so much regarded as an end in itself-although Raz does acknowledge its value with
respect to the protection of personal autonomy-as it is a means to ensure that conduct is guided
efficiently. J. RAZ, supra note 3, at 210-29. This misconstrual of positivism on Dworkin"s part is a
consequence of his insisting on looking at all theories of law, and not just his own, through the lens
of adjudication. R. DwoRKIN, supra note 85, at 93, 400-01.
109. J. RAZ, supra note 1, at 129-31; J. RAZ, supra note 3, at 87-88, 105-1 1.
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applying institutions is the application of pre-existing (i.e., previouslyadopted) norms whose purpose is to guide conduct. Adjudicative institutions simply evaluate behavior in accordance wi th the standards v1hich
were supposed to have anteced ently guided it: "[Institutionalized systems] contain norms guiding behavior and institutions for evaluating and
judging behaviour. The evaluatio n is based on the very same norms
wh ich guide behaviour." 1 10 Raz is somewhat a mbivalent about whether
a legal system must necess::uily make provision for the settlem ent of disputes that are not regulated by preexisting law, 111 but this issue need not
concern us here. T he point to be em phasized for presen t purposes is that
the idea that the fanction of law is to guide conduct is a fundamental
elemen t in Raz' s legal theory; to a large extent it determines the shape of
the theo ry's other elements, including, most importantly, the role that
the theory assigns to adjudicative institutions like courts.
The idea that t he function of law is to guide behavior is a consequence of Raz's understand ing of the institutionalized nature of law. It
thus serves as a kind of bridge between the two general theses which were
identified earlier as underlying Raz's approach to legal theory, namely,
(1) that law gives rise in a systematic way to reasons for action, and (2)
that legal philosoph y involves the study of a particular kind of social
institution. It is time now to focus more closely on the first of these two
theses by examining in greater detail the way in which the law is said to
provide guidance for conduct. Raz quite plausibly maintains that iaw
guides conduct not sim ply by providing information about what is separately required by the balance of reasons, 112 but by giving rise to new
reasons for action. 113 What we must inquire into, then, is the nature of
these new reasons which the law brings into being.
Since all legal systems impose sanctions for the breach of at least
some legal rules, it is in a sense obvious that law gives rise to new reasons
for act ion. But affecting a person's motivations through the provision of
sanctions is not, acco rding to Raz, the way that the law primarily intend s
110. J. R.-\Z , supra note 1, at 139 ; see also id. at 142 (official eva luation of behavior must coinc ide with the guid anc•: which the system gives to ordin a ry individu a ls); J. RAZ, supra no te 3, at 108
(" Primary [n o rm -app lying] organs [i.e., co urt s] are conce rned with the authoritative dete rmin ation
of normative si tu a tion s in accorda nce with pre-existing norm s."); cf id. at 112 .
lll. Compare J. RAZ , supra note 3, a t 113, 172-75 (a// lega l sys tem s make pro vision for the
sett lem ent of un regulated d isputes) with id. at 96 (most do); see also Perry, supra note 56, a t 231 n. 56
(Raz does no t relate hi s c laim that the se ttl e m ent of unreg ula ted di sputes is a p rim ar v function of
law to hi s most central thes is th a t the essence of law is to guide be havi or).
112. Raz calls this the recognitiona! concept of authority. S ee J. RA Z , sup ra not e 6, at 28- 3 1.
11 3. See Raz, supra note 17, at 305 ("[T]he fact that an authority issu ed a directive changes the
subjects' reaso ns.").
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to guide behavior; it is only a rei nforcing consideration. 114 The fact that
law is backed by a sanction is a first- order reaso n for action only, 1 15
whereas the law intends to guide behavior by creating new exclusionary
reasons for action. 11 6 Through its organs such as the courts the lavv necessarily claims legitimate c: uthority for itself, 11 7 and according to Raz's
service conception of aut horit y this means that (the most i:rnportant 01
basic) laws must be in tended to be peremptory or excl usio nary reasons
for action which (all or some) ordinary citizens are intended to follow .
In light of earlier discussion it is clearly subjective exclusionary reasons
which are at issue here , since the essence of Raz's analysis of a.uthority is
that one should act on the authority's rather than on one's ownjudgment
of what the objective balance of reasons requires. The most fundamental
characteristic of the ne;v reaso ns for action to which law gi ves rise is
therefore that they stand in for, not that they modify, the objective balance of reason s (although it must be emphasized that in certain circumstances they can and indeed should do both). 118 Laws are thus subjective
second- order reasons on Raz's account, but it is clear enoug h that he
does not allow for the possibility that they could be epistemicallybounded reasons . 1 19 Raz regards laws as being what were earlier labelled
pure exclusionary reasons, and it will be recalled that the use of the term
"exclusionary reason" has been restricted here to pure exclusionary
reasons.
4.

The Sources Thesis

The sources thesis prov ides the core content of Raz's positivism. He
characteri zes the thesis in the fo llowing terms: "A jurisprudential theory
is acceptable only if its tests for identifying the con tent of the la'N and
determining its existence depend exclusively on fac ts of human behaviour
114. J. RA Z, supra note 84. at 232.
115. J. RAZ, supra note I. at 16 1.
116. J. RAZ, supra note 3, at 30. Note that for Raz w hat the law "intends"' is a mat ter of what
th e organs of governm en t. and in parti c ul a r the co urt s, int end. See id. ; J . RAz. supra note 84, a t 23032; J. RAZ . sup ra note 6. at 70; Raz, Harl on !'.fora/ Rigl11s and Duries, 4 OXFORD J. L EGM. ST UD.
123, 13 1 ( 1984).
11 7. J. R AZ, supra no te 3, at 30 ('"(I ]t is a n esse nti a l feature o f la w that it claims iegitimate
authori ty for itself."). See also id. at 237 .
11 8. See supra no te 51 and accompa nying text.
11 9. In Th e Moraliry of Freedom Raz says that a "clea r mistake" -t ype of limi tation wou ld be
consisrent wit h hi s acco unt of au thority, but he d oes not concede th at legitim ate auth o riti es are ever
in fac t so limited. J. RA Z, supra not e 6, a t 62. In The Aurhoriry of L a w h e s ta tes th a t, apart from
scope and jurisdictional li mitation s, o ne who accepts th e leg itimacy o f an a uth ority is comm itted to
foll owing it "blindly." J. RAZ. supra note 3, at 24-2 5. This is an impli cit denial of th e poss ibility of
an epistemic limi tation.
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capable of being described in value-neutral terms, and applied without
resort to moral argument." 120 The idea that the law claims legitimate
authority for itself, and therefore intends to guide behavior in an exclusionary sense, is the ultimate basis of Raz's most important argument for
the sources thesis. (He deploys other arguments as well, but they all
either reduce to the upcoming argument or else can be dismissed as
unpersuasive. 121 ) T he immediate premise of this argument is the claim of
the service conception of authority that an authority should base its
action-guiding directives on dependent reasons, i.e., on reasons which
"apply to the subjects of those directives and which bear on the circumstances covered by the directives." 122 It is then concluded that the
sources thesis is justified because the subjects of an authority "can benefit
by its decisions only if they can establish their existence and content in
ways which do not depend on raising the very same issues which the
aut hority is there to settle." 123
It is worth drawing attention to the connection which exists between
this argument for the sources thesis and the purpose which Raz attributes to exclusionary norms generally. As was mentioned earlier, Raz's
view is that the purpose of such norms is to simplify practical reasoning.
This is achieved through the provision of an intermediate level of reasons
on which agents will in the ordinary run of cases be able to act without
having to refer to ultimate values or other justifying reasons. The
sources thesis simply indicates the manner in which authoritative legal
directives in particular are to be identified if this isolation from ultimate
justifying reasons is to be successfully achieved . The rationale, so far as
the law is concerned, for regarding such isolation as desirable is that the
law claims legitimate authority for itself and therefore presupposes, for
reasons we have already examined, that at least some of its subjects are to
a greater or lesser degree uncertain about what the objective balance of
reasons requires (i.e., they are uncertain about what action is demanded
by the ultimate justifying reasons). T he sources thesis is thus an important element in a strategy for dealing with practical uncertainty. This
does not mean, as Raz himself has emphasized several times, that laws
themselves cannot be uncertain or controversial. What it does mean is
that "the law fails in [its mediating] role if it is not, in general, easier to
establish and less controversial than t he underlying considerations it
120. J. RAZ, supra note 3, at 39-40. For additional discussion of the sources thesis see J. RAZ.
supra note 84, at 212-16; Raz, supra note 17. at 300-05. 315-20.
121.

See Perry, supra note 56. at 227-30.

122.

Raz, supra note 17, at 299.
!d. at 304.

123.
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reflects ." 124
R az states that the sources thesis is the most fund amental of the
various theses which have historically been associated with positivism, 125
and there is good reason to think that he is righ t about this. T h e sources
thesis high lights the traditional positivist id ea th at law is something
·wh ich has been posited or created by hu man beings. Furthermore, its
j ustifica tion is grounded in a view of the poin t or function of law which
has figured at least implicitly, and usually ex pli citly, in. the work of all
th e great positivist thinkers, including Ho bbes, Bentham, Austin,
Holmes, K elsen, and Hart. T hat view is that the primary point or function of law is to guide the conduct of ordina ry citize ns. In formul ating
the sources thesis and defending it in terms of this conception of the
functio n of law, Raz has captured the essence of th e positivist position,
framed it in precise terms, and developed a powerful argument in its
favor.

It is worth remarking that Raz's version of positivism is not committed to the truth of the historical positivist thesis that law and morals
are separable. He takes the sources thesis, not the separability thesis, to
be the essence of positivism, and then defines the latter in such a way that
it does not simply follow from the former. 126 His definition of the separabi lity thesis differs from that of many writers, since he maintains the
following: "A necessary connection between law and morality does not
require that truth as a moral principle be a condition of legal validity.
A ll it requi res is that the social features which identify something as a
legal system entail that it possesses moral value ." 127 Raz thinks that the
ve rsion of the separability thesis which is associated with the second of
these two views on what constitutes a necessary connection between law
and morality could well be false:
The claim that what is law and what is not is purely a matter of social
fac t stiil leaves it an open question whether or not those social facts by
wh ich we identify the law or determin e its ex istence do or do not
endow it with moral merit. If they do , it has of necessity a moral
character. 128

124 .
( 1986) .

!d. at 319 ; see also Raz, The Inn er Logic of the Law, 10 R EC HTSTHEORI E 10 1, 112-13

125.

J. RAZ. supra n o te 3, a t 38.
id. at 38-39.
Raz, supra note 17, at 3 1!.
J. R.-'>Z, supra note 3, a t 38-39; see also J. RAZ, supra note 1, a t 165 -70; Ra z , supra note 17.

126.
127.
12 8.

a t 3 11-1 2, 319-20.

l
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Raz's ve rsi on of positivism is thus compatible with at least certain t ypes
of natural law theory. 129
Raz is only able to define the separability thesis in th e way that he
does because he accepts the sources thesis, w hi ch n ot a ll contemporary
legal theorists who call themselves posi tiv ists d o. L egal theorists 'Nho d o
not accept it tend to defend a version of th e sepa ra bility thesis th at is
associ.:Hed with th e first of the two vievvs de s'.~ri be d by R az of wh a t co n sti tutes c. necessa ry connection between la•;v an d morality . There is nonethel ess a. sense in which Raz's ve rs ion of positivism is stronger in its
insistence on the separation of law and m orals tha n the the ories of thos e
same writers, since the so urc es thesis ru les out the possibility that tb e
ide nt iftc ation of individual laws can even sometirnes t urn on mora1 a rgu··
men ts. David Lyons, Philip Soper , and J ul es Coleman have a ll d efended
the view that this possibility is compatible with positivism. 130 Since th e
concept ion of law which results from thi s view ultimatel y seems to be
more D work inian in character than anyth ing else, 13 1 there are stron g
grounds for co ncluding that Raz's approach and not theirs comes closer
to capturing the essence of positivism.

5.

Lega l R easoning and Precedent

I n addition to playing an important role in the justification of the
sources thesis, the idea that the basic function of iaw is to guide conduct
a lso serves as the foundation of a distinctive positivist conception of legal
reaso ning and judicial lawmaking. The mos t fundamental type of law,
according to Raz, is a duty-imposing rul e which provides exclusionary
guid ance for the population at large, or at leas t for a ~.egment of t h e
popu lation. T he significa nce of other types of laws, for exampie, powercon ferri ng laws, is explained by their logical relation s to duty- im posing
la.ws. 132 T he basic obligation of a court is to evaluate the behavior of
citizens by mean s of the same pre-existing legal ru les which are supposed
- -- - - - - - - -129. Cf J. RAZ, supra not e 3, at 39, 44-45, 157-59.
130. S r>e Co leman, Nega tive and Positive Posiiivism, 11 j. LEGAL STUD. 139, i 4 8 (1982) ; Lyon s,
Pnncip les. Posiu vism. and Legal Theory, 87 YAL E LJ. 4! 5, 425-2 6 ( 1977); So per, L egal Th eory und
!he Obligation of a Judge: The H art/Dworkin Disp ute, 75 MICH. L. REv. 473, 511-12 (1 977) . R az
cr itici zes the Soper-Lyons-Coleman pos itio n in R az, supra no te 17, at 311 -1 5; see also I. R AZ, supra
note 3, a t 47 n. 8.
131. R. D WOR KI N, RIGHTS , supra note 93 , a t 345-50; R. DW O !'.Kli'i , supra no te 85, at 124-2 9.
Dwo rkin calls the Soper-Lyons-Co leman position "soft co nven ti ona li sm ."
132. J. RAZ, supra note 3, at 176; J. RAZ, supra no te 6, at 44. Raz does say, howeve r, th at
power-co nferring rules also guide behavior (nam ely the behav ior of the pow er-h older), alth oug h th e
na ture of the guidance whi ch th ey provide is "indeterminat e·· rath er t ha n exclusiona ry. See J. R.o. z,
supra note 84, a t 228-29 .
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to have antecedently guided their conduct. In most legal systems courts
also have the authority to settle disputes to which the positive law does
not provide a clear solution. 133 Courts which have assumed this role
resemble legislatures, since they are acting at what Raz calls the deliberative rather than the executive stage of public decisionmaking. 134 Courts
acting at this stage look to sourceless considerations such as moral principles and values, and when they do so "they em:: not relying on legally
binding considerations but exercising their o~;vn clisc:retion." 135 Such discretion can be limited by source-based principles which themselves have
legal status, but discretion-guiding principles "wi ll not eliminate the element of personal judgment of the merits." 136
In some legal systems, for example those of common law j urisdictions, courts do not simply settle unregulated disputes but treat their own
decisions as giving rise to new law. Raz states that within the practical
limits on such courts' lawmaking powers which inevitably result frorn
their being able to revise the law only incrementally, "[they] act and
should act just as legislators do, namely, they should adopt those rules
which they judge best." 137 Precedent-based legal rules are, like the rules
which derive from other social sources such as legislation, exclusionary
in character. Raz recognizes that the common law in particular possesses what he calls a "special revisability" in the hands of judges, but he
nonetheless insists that while judge-made law can be said to be "metaphorically" less binding than enacted law, "[s]trictly speaking judgemade law is binding and valid, just as much as enacted la\v." 138 Common law rules "are binding in their essential rationale and as applied to
their context." 139 Since the common law binds courts as well as citizens,
a court cannot "repeal" a common law rule by overruling a previous
decision simply because it considers that that would be the best thing to
do on the balance of reasons; courts can only reject binding common law
rules for certain reasons, among which are included injustice, iniquitous
discrimination, and being out of touch with the court's conception of the
Sec supra note Ill.
J. RAZ, supra note 84, at 213-14; Raz. supra note 82. at 214-16.
135. J. RAZ, supra note 3, at 59. Raz sometimes suggests that courts have a legal duty not to
make decisions arbitrarily, but in the light of his own positivist understanding of legal reasoning and
adjudication this seems to be an unwarranted conclusion. See Perry, supra note 56, at 230 n.54, 231
n.56 & 233 n.65.
136. J. RAZ, supra note 3, at 113. On discretion-guiding principles generaliy, see id. at 96-97,
and Raz, Legal Principles and the Limits of Law, 81 YALE L.J. 823 ( 1972).
133.
134.

137.
138.
139.

J. RAZ, supra note 3, at 197.
!d. at 195.
!d. at 189.
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relevant area of law. 140 The doctrine of precedent itself is regarded by
Raz as a Hartian customary rule of recognition. 141 Like all rules of recognition it is duty-imposing. 142 This means that the doctrine of precedent is, for Raz, an exclusionary rule that requires courts to treat
precedents as giving rise to exclusionary rules. The list of reasons just
enumerated on which courts are permitted to rely in rejecting a common
hnv rule is therefore the category of nonexcluded reasons which fall
outs ide
scope of the exclusionary rule that constitutes the doctrine of
precedent.
B.

AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY

Raz's positivist conception of both law and legal reasoning IS
founded on the idea that the basic function of law is to provide guidance
for the conduct of ordinary citizens, where "guidance" is to be understood as exclusionary guidance. The focus of the theory is thus upon the
reasons for action that the law provides for the population as a whole;
those reasons, whi ch Raz maintains are (subjective) exclusionary reasons, then define the basic legal obligations of the courts in evaluating
citizens' actual conduct. One can summarize Raz's positivism, and
indeed much of the positivist tradition, in an overly crude and somewhat
inaccurate way by saying that it begins with a theory of legislation, where
legislated enactments are understood as being, for the most part, directed
to the general population, and then uses that theory as the basis of an
account of adjudication. 143 This is somewhat inaccurate so far as Raz's
version of positivism is concerned because, like Hart, he emphasizes the
theoret ical priority of norm-applying over norm- creating institutions,
and in fact does not even insist that a legal system must contain a distinct
norm-creating institution like a legislature. 144 The reasons that he gives
to justify this priority are not a matter of present concern. 145 The important point for our purposes is that Raz takes the central case of a law to
140. !d. at 114-15, 189-90; J. RAZ, supra note I, at 140-41.
141. J. RAZ, supra note 3, at 95-96, 184 n.8.
142. !d. at 92-93, 179.
143. Ernest Weinrib discusses the general theoretical emphasis which positivism places on legislation in Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949, 955-56
(1988). He notes that "[p]ositivists consider even adjudication to be a species of legislative activity."
!d. at 956.
144. J. RAZ, supra note I, at 129-31.
145. See supra note 109. Essentially, Raz regards norm-applying institutions as theoretically
important because of their role in the identification of laws. Laws of a particular legal system are
identified, according to Raz, by Hartian rules of recognition, i.e., by customary judicial rules. See
generally J. RAZ, supra note 3, at 90-97. Raz accepts, to begin with, the Hartian thesis that "the test
by which we determine whether a norm belongs to the system is, roughly speaking, that it is a norm
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be an exclusionary rule which has been deliberately adopted by a political
aut hority, that is to say, a rule which has been created by a deliberate
legislctive ac t. 146 I t is in this sense that Raz's version of positivism
begins with a theory of legislation. That theory is then used to offer a
:Jartial account of adjudication by means of a rela ted thesis which states
that courts ha ve a lega l obligation to evaluate the behavior of citizens in
accordance \Vith the same exclusionary rules that were supposed to have
guiclecl their conduct beforehand. A, theory of adj ud ication that tells
courts
to decide unregulated cs.ses-these being cases in wh ich
law does not provide a clear answer or where the courts have a pmver to
chaLge the rules 147 -is a moral theory only, not a theory of law. 148
There is, however, an alternative conception of law and legal reasonmg, -which v.;ill be referred to here as adjudicativism. 149 It begins with
the premise that the basic function of law is not the guidance of citizens'
conduct as such but rather the institutionalized adjudication and social
resolution of disputes in accordance with appropriate principles of per~
sonal and political morality. These latter principles could be principles
of indiv id ual justice, or they could be standards that promote a particular
conception of the public good, or they could be a combination of both.
They could in fact be constitutive of any tenable moral vision of personal
interaction and/ or social life that a particular theorist or judge regarded
as an appropriate basis for adjudication: different m oral visions will simply produce different versions of adjudicativism. The general point to be
emphasized is that adjudicativist theories, like positivist theories, begin
·with a theory of reasons for action. The difference between the two
approaches is that for an adjudicativist the reasons for action t hat are
theoretically most significant are those which are and should be acted
upon by courts. Adjudicativism is by no means necessarily committed to
the position that courts should be concerned solely with the rights and
interests of the parties before them and so should ignore the more general
which the [courts] ought to apply .... " J. RAz. supra note l, at 139; see also J. RAZ, supra note 3. at
90-91. In light of Raz•s own conclusive criticisms of Hart's theory of social rules, J. RAZ, supra note
1, at 53-53, and hence of Hart's claim that that theory can explain the normativity of law, it is
somewhat puzzling that Raz would continue to accept the further Hartian thesis that the norms
which courts oughl to apply are determined by a customary judicial rule. This issue cannot be
considered here.
146. See. e.g.. Raz, supra note 17. at 303 ("a directive can be authoritatively binding only if it is,
or at least is presented as, someone·s view of how its subjects ought to behave"). This does not mean
that Raz is committed to the view that every law has a single author. See id. at 318.
147. J. RAZ, s11pra note 3, at 96.
148. Cf. Raz, supra note 82. at 217.
149. See Perry. supra note 56. at 215-18. In my earlier paper I referred to adjudicativism as the
"adjudJCiitivc .. approach to legal theory.
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social impact of their decisions. But it nonetheless remains true that
adjudicativists, unlike positivists such as Raz, take the essence of a theory of law to be, not a theory of legislation, but a theory of adjudication
(although it is of course also true that an adjudicativist theory must specify how legislation is to figure in the disposition of cases). The starting
point of adjudicati vism is thus very similar to what R az refers to as the
lawyers' perspective. In commenting on the lawyers' perspective, Raz
states that it is " arbitrary as an ultimate starting point. " 150 In fact it
simply adopts a diffe rent evaluative understanding from positivism of the
essential function of legal institutions.
An adjudicativist conception of law and legal reaso ning has ahvays
underlain Professor Dworkin's approach to legal theory, as evidenced by
the following passage from Lm·v's Empire: "Our concept of law ties law
to the present justification of coercive force and so ties law to adjudication; law is a matter of rights tenable in court." 151 D workin in fact maintains that the view expressed in this quotation applies not just to his own
conception of law but to the general concept of law, which means that he
looks at all possible theories of law and not just his own from an adjudicativist perspective. This is a mistake, and when Dworkin attempts to
reshape positivism in particular so that it will fit into an adjudicativist
mold-the reformed version is referred to as conventionalism-positivism emerges severely distorted. 152 There is no denying, however, that in
Dworkin's own theory of law, which he calls "law as integrity," he
makes use of the adjudicativist conception to fashion a very compelling
interpretation of modern legal institutions. 153 Michael Moore 154 and
Ernest \Veinrib 155 are two other outstanding examples of contemporary
150. Raz, supra note 82, at 212.
151. R. DWORKIN. supra note 85. at 400-01; see also R. DWORK1N, RIGHTS , supra note 93. at
338, 347-48 (function of law is principl ed adjudication, not the provision of standards for private and
official conduct). An early indication that Dworkin was adopting an adjudicativist approach can be
found in Dworkin, Does Law Have a Function? A Comment on the Two-Level Theory of Decision, 74
YALE L.J. 640, 640 ( 1965) ('"What, in general, is a good reason for decision by a court of law? This
is the question of jurisprudence; it has been asked in an amazing number of forms, of which the
classic 'What is Law?" is only the briefest.").

See supra note 108.
R. DwoRK1N, supra note 85, especially chs. 6, 7.
154. Set> Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277 (1985) [hereinafter Moore, Natural Law]; Moore. Precedent, Induction, and Ethical Generalization, in PRECEDENT 1N LAw 183 (L. Golds rein ed . 1987) [hereinafter Moore, Precedent]; Moore, The Semamics of
Judging, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 151 (1981).
155. See Weinrib, The Insurance Justification and Private Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 681 (198 5)
[hereinafter Weinrib, Insurance Justification]; Weinrib, The Inielligibi!ity of the Rule of Law, in THE
RULE OF LAW: IDEAL OR IDEOLOGY 59 (A. Hutchinson & P. Monahan eds. 19 87) [hereinafter
Weinrib, Inielligibi!iiy]; Weinrib. Law as a Kantian Idea of Reason, 87 COLUM. L. RE V. 472 (1987);
152.
153.
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legal theorists who are probably best regarded as having adopted an
adjudicativist app roach. The respective theories of Dworkin, Moore, and
Weinrib are very differen t from one another in many respects, but there
is a fundamental similarity in that all three can be understood as taking
the essence of a theory of law to be a theory of adjudicatio n . A theo ry of
adjudication, as well as being a theory of reasons for action , is also of
course a moral theory. T here is, therefore, a sense in which the adjudicati vist approac h discerns a necessary connection between law and morality. It is thus unsurprising that Moore and Weinrib both ·~x pli c itl y
identify themselves as natural Jaw theorists, and that Dworkin has from
time to time flirted with this label as well. 156
It might seem that the difference between the positivist and the
adjudicativist approaches to legal theory is not a fundamental one but
ultimately comes down to nothing more than slight nuances in perspective, or even to semantics. Positivism, or at least the kind of positivism
defended by Raz, begins with a theory of legislation, i.e. , with a theory of
reasons for action that apply to the population at large, and then characterizes adjudication as the activity of evaluating citizens' conduct on the
basis of whether or not they have complied with those reasons. It is
obvious, the argument will then go, that an adjudicativist theory must
specify how legislation is to be taken into consideration by courts in
deciding cases. The most defensible such account will run something
along these lines: a well- ordered society requires some person or body to
provide (exclusionary) guidance for citizens with respect to at least certain matters, and a democratically- elected legislature that enjoys effective
de facto authority is, morall y speaking, the most appropriate such bod y.
A court will then have good moral reasons to evaluate the cond uct of
citizens in accordance with whatever legislated rules apply to their activities, so that where legislation is concerned there will be no practical differences between the positivist and the adj udicativist approaches. As for
unregulated disputes, the argument will conclude, the adjudicativist is
free to apply the label "law" to the sorts of moral considerations that
everyone will agree should be relied upon by courts in deciding such
Weinrib, Liberty, Communi1y and Correcuve Juslice, 1 CAN. J. L. & J URIS. 3 (1988); Weinrib,
Toward a Moral Th eory of Negligence Law, 2 LAW & PHIL. 37 (1983) [hereinafter Weinrib, Moral
Th eory]; Weinrib, supra note 143.
156. Dworkin, 'Wa1ural" Law R evisi1ed , 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 165 ( 19 82) . Adjudicativist na tura l
law th eor ies must be distinguished from what might be ca ll ed trad iti o na l natura l law th eories, whic h
cla im that there is a systematic connection of some sort between valid positive la w and m o ral va lue.
For a recent example of the latter sort of theo ry see J. FlNNlS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURA L
RIGHTS ( 1980).
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cases, but this will simply lead to a difference of semantics, not substance,
and one that is again of no practical sign ificance.
There is a grain of good sense to this argument, but it goes too far in
downplaying the possible differences between positivis t and adjudicativist
theories. To begin with , there are other possible accounts, not all of
them cornpletely implausible, of the ways in which courts should take
legislation into consideration in deciding cases. T he adjudicativist theory
which Dwork in refers to in Law's Empire as pragmatism, and vv hich he
acknmvledges to be in so me respects a very powerful conception of law,
proposes that judges should adopt what amounts to a ra ther cavalier attitude towa rds statu tory enactments. 15 7 In Dworkin's own early writings
he himself seemed inclined to say no more than that courts should " pay a
qualified deference to the acts of the legislature. " 1 5 R Such views are not
common , however, since most adjudicativist theorists seem to regard legislati on in very much the same way that Raz conceives of law generally.
They thus look upon courts as being bound, in a sense which it would not
be unfair to characterize as exclusionary, to apply statutes according to
their terms. T his would seem to be true of Moore, 159 for example, and,
since "Hard Cases," of Dworkin as well. 160 Im portant differences
remain, of course. For instance, Moore and Dworkin both view rules of
statutory construction in a very different way from Raz. 161 Still, on the
whole it can be said that so far as the treatment and understanding of
legislation is concerned, the similarities among the approaches taken by
these three theorists far outweigh the differences. The argument under
con sideration is therefore correct in its conclusion that adj udicativist and
positivist theories can and often do converge upon interpretations of the
judicial practice of applying statutes which are, for the most part, mutually compatible. Each looks at the phenomenon from a slightly different
157. R. DWORKIN, supra no te 85, at 147 , 154 , 15 8.
15 8. R. DWORK IN, RIGHTS, supra note 93, a t 37.
159 . Moore describes reasoning from statutes as a "text bound ent erprise. " Moore, Natural
Law, supra nole 154 , at 282- 83 . This he contrasts with comm on law reasoning, which does not
depend on the int erp retation of a tex t. Moore, Precedent, supra no te 154, at 184. I a m assuming
tha t the constraints imposed by a text are anal yzab le in exclusionary terms.
160. See, e.g. , R. DwoRKIN , RIGHTS, supra note 93, at 107-1 0. Dworkin does not spec ifically
desc ribe statutes as exc lu sionarily binding, but thi s would see m to be impli cit in th e idea that Hercu les, Dwo rki n's idea l judge, mu st take statutes as a give n part of th e settled law for which he has to
co nst ruct the bes t justification. S ee also R. DWOR KIN, supra note 85, at 401 (if a judge is satisfied
that a st atute admit s of only one interpretation th en he must enforce this as law).
161. Fo r both Moore and Dw orkin the interpreta ti on of a sta tute necessarily invo lves moral
arg ument. S ee R. DWORK IN, supra no te 85, at 337-43 a nd passim; Moo re, Natural Law, supra note
154 , a t 381 -9 3. For Raz, on th e oth er hand, rul es of sta tutory int erpretati o n invo lve th e imputation
of ac tual intenti ons to law-mak ers, so that their charact er "'is a m a tt er of fact and not a moral issue."
Raz , supra not e 17, a t 3 18.
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perspective, but the pictures they draw of it are generally consistent wit h
one another.
The argument noneth eless goes too far in its claim tha t there are no
substan tial differences between adjudicativist and positi vist theories of
law. It com pletel y overlooks ano ther dimension of the legal wo rld which
any adeq uate theo ry of iaw will satisfacto rily have to acco unt for ,
nam ely, jud icial dec isionmaking of the sort associated wi th the common
lc:<.\V. I t is in fact on the common law , and on private common law in
particula r, that adjud icativist theorists tend to focus t hei r atten tion:
Dworkin ackno wledges that " ordinary civi l cases at law" are the principal subject of his famous essay "Hard Cases," 162 and Weinrib's theory of
corrective justice is precisely a theory of private common law. 16 3 Raz
offers a n interpretation of the common law process according to which
the standards of the common law are exclusionary rules, binding for citizens and courts alike, that in all essential res pects are no different from
legi slated enactments. Adjudicativist theorists tend to reject any such
interpretation of judicial lawmaking, 164 however, which suggests that the
common law m ight prove to be fruitfu l territory for discovering significant substantive differences between the adjudicativist and the positivist
approaches to legal theory. The remainder of this Paper will consist of a
preliminary scouting of this territory with a view to showing that Raz's
positivist conception of the common law is an inadequate one, and that
what is called for instead is an adjudicativist interpretation. The ultimate
conclusion will be that Raz's positivism does not provide a satisfactory
account of the found ations of law, or at least that it does not provide a
com plete account.
Raz's interpretation of t he common law, like the general theory of
law of which it forms a part, is based on his analysis of legitimate authority and his conception of a subjective exclusionary reason. His interpretation i S thus gro unded in a clear and rigorously developed account of
162. R . DWORKI N, R IGHTS, supra note 93, at 94 n.l; see also id. a t 84, 100; cf. R. DWORK IN,
supra note 85, at !43 (Law's Empire is to a large ext ent co ncerned with private law).
163. See supra note I 55.
164. See R. DWO RK IN , supra no te 85, at 24-25 ("relaxed" d oc trin e o f precedent d em a nds onl y
that a judge give some weight to past decis io ns on th e sa me issue, wh ere the initial pres umption in
their favor can be o u tweighed if th ey a re thought suffi c ien tly wrong); R. DwORK IN, RI GHTS, supra
not e 93, a t 38 (doctrin e of precedent is not a rule but a princip le and can therefo re be outweighed by
oth er principles); MOORE, Precedenl , supra note 154, at 184 (comm o n law reasoning, not being
text bou nd, resembles ethical reaso nin g); id . at 187 (courts a re to decide di s put es, not issue ca nonical
s ta tements o r edi c ts li ke a little legis lature); id. at 202 (doc trine o f preced e nt does no t g ive ri se to
prac ti ce rules in R a w ls' se nse); Weinrib, M oral Theory , supra note ! 55, a t 42 (co mmon law o f torts is
con stituted almost en tirely by its spec ifi c instances of di spute resoluti o n, wh ich assum e a systematic
aspec t o nly because lik e cases ought to be decided alik e) .
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practical reasoning which permits law to be explicated within the context
of a strategy for dealing 'Nith uncertainty about w hat the obj ective balance of reasons requires. One problematic aspect of adjudicativist theories of law is that while they reject anything resembli ng a Razian
un derstanding of the common law, t hey do not offer an al te rnat ive
und erstanding in which the character and rol e of the re levaEt processes
of practical reason ing are worked out in similarly cl ear on d precise
te rms. It will be argued in v,;hat fo llows that the notions of a reweighti ng
reason and an epistemically-bounded reason that were ddined earlier
provide the basis for such an understanding. These ty pes of reasons are
simply va riations on Raz's general theme of a second-order reason for
action. Their recognition as distinct types of re aso ns does not, therefore,
lead to any radical modifications of Raz's analysis either of practical reasoning generally or of legitimate authority in particular. H o\vever, their
utilization within an adjudicativist theory of law facilitates the formulation of an interpretation of t he common law which is descriptively and
evaluatively superior to Raz's positivist interpretation. There is thus a
sense in which Raz himself provides the means, in the form of his not ion
of a second- order reason, for demonstrating that his own positivist theory of Jaw is in certain respects deficient.
C.

THE COMMON LAW AND LEGAL THEORY

The inquiry into the proper theoretical understanding of the com mon law will begin by showing how the officials of a certain kind of
instit utionalized normative system that could only be adequ ately
desc ribed in adjudicativist terms might introduce a doctrine of precedent
into the system witho ut thereby depriving it of its adjudicat ivist character. A brief summary will then be offered of arguments presented elsewhe re which support the conclusion that the picture of judicia l
lawmaking that emerges from this thou ght- experiment better captures
the essence of the common law than does the positivis t conception
defended by Raz. Finally, certain objections which R az might make to
the conclusion that an adjudicativist interpretation of the comn10n :law is
superior to his own positivist interpretation will be considered .

1.

Systems of Absolu te Discretion

Raz describes a certain kind of normati ve system \V hich he says
must be distinguished from a legal system. 165 A system of absolute discretion, as he calls it, consists of one or more tribunals to which members
165.

J. RAZ, supra not e 1, at 137-41; J. RAZ, supra not e 3, at! 11-14, 173 -75.
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of the relevant society can refer their disputes for resolu tion. Tribunals
have the au thorit y to settle disputes and determine the rights and duties
of individ uals conclusively, but there are no legislated or customary stan··
dards which they have to apply, nor are they obligated to fo l1ovv their
own precedents. Yet they cannot decide cases arbitrarily: " they are
always w make that decision which they think to be best Oil t'ne b\sis of
all the valid reasons." 1oii A tribunal must have reasons for i<: s actions,
but the determination of which reasons are applicable iE a part i '.~~d::<r case
and of \Vhc.t decision they support is always a matter tha.t is within its
absolute discretion. Raz says that some regularity in the c:kcisions of
these tr ibunc.ls coul d be expected, but because individmd judges vvill
sometimes change their minds from one case to another, 0.n d because
they wiii in any event differ among themselves about what right reason
requires, the degree of regularity is not li kely to be very high . The system will not provide individuals with very much guidance concerning
how they ought to conduct themselves so as to be entitled to a decision in
their favor should they ever become involved in a dispute. But legal systems do provide such guidance, and that is why Raz says that systems of
absolute discretion are not legal systems.
The system of absol ute discretion described by Raz is an institutionalized regime of adjudication that clearly falls within the purview of an
adjudicativist understanding of law. The reasons in accordance with
which the judges of the system are expected to settle disputes will always
be moral reasons . (M orality is to be understood here in a broad sense, so
that it could include such matters as a concern for economic efficiency .)
The questions that j udges will sometimes disagree or change their minds
about are questions pertaining to the determination of what decision is
called for in particular cases by the objective balance of morally relevant
reasons. It is only because there is to some degree or another a general
lack of certaint y (or at least consensus) about what the objec tive balance
of reasons requires t hat the system will fail to produce the regularity in
decisionmaking that could guide individuals' conduct. If j udges (and
people generally) were all so strongly convinced that t hey knew what
right reason req uired that they seldom changed their mind s, and if everyone shared the same convictions (say because each person generally got
the answer right), then regularity in decisionmaking would be quite high.
But the system would sti li not be a legal system in R az's sense, si nce
neither jud ges nor citizens would be relying on subjective exclusionary
reasons th a t had issued from an authoritative<source.
166.

J. R.-\Z. supra no te I , at 138.
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In fact, of course, there is ve ry often individual uncertainty or a lack
of consensus (i.e. , general uncertainty) among human beings about vvhat
the objective balance of reasons requires. Neither judges no r anyone else
possess a for mal decision procedure which will permit a mechanica l an d
error free determin ation of vvhich reasons are morally relevant to \Vh ich
sorts of disputes &.nd of v; hat res ults they entail in the agg regate. Let us
refer to the awareness th at human agents sometimes possess of the possibili ty that they :might not know what m orality requi res in a partic ul;;-:r
type situation as m oral uncertainty . (T h is is just a special instance of
the practical unc-ert ai nty th at was defin ed earlier.) Given the existence of
individual moral u.ncertainty and/o r lack of consensus about moral :rn at ters, Raz is undoubtedly correct to predict that in a system of absolu te
discretion the degree of regula rit y in decisionmaking will be relatively
low. If the decisions of tribunals were too unpredictable t hen the resu lt
might be a serio us interference with individual autonomy, since a lack of
stability in the ''legal" en vironment cou ld impair a person's ability to
plan hi s or her life on anythin g other than a short-term basis. Let us
sup pose that the system of absolute discretion contains only one judge.
She is aware of the potential problem of interference with individual
autonomy and has to decide what, if anything, should be done about it.

or

2.

Dealing with J!/loral Uncertainty: The Development of
a Doctrine of Precedent

One possible strategy which m ight occur to the judge would be to
take directly into accoun t in the balance of reasons the actual expectations about the manner in v~h ic h particular kinds of disputes were likely
to be reso lved that had been h eld, either by litigants themselves or by a
m ajority of comrnunity mem bers, during the time before a given dispu te
actually arose . But this wo uld be problematic for a number of reasons .
F irst, while there would always be an abstract expectation that the judge
would settle the dispute in accordance with her best present understanding of what righ t reason required, there might not be any concrete expectati ons abou t what she wou ld d o in a particular type of case. T his
situat ion wo uld be especi ally li kely to occur if the judge had not previously exh ibited any marked regularity in decisionmaking. Second, it
migh t be ve ry diffi cult to ascertain what people's con crete ex pectations
had been, supposing that the y existed. T he litigants themselves migh t be
something less t han truthful after the event , and determining community
opinic n is never an easy mat ter. F inally, the moral status of such expectations wo uld itself be problema tic. Since the judge has not committed
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herself in any way to follo wing her own precedents, those concrete expectations that did exist would be mere pred ictions, not expectations that
vvere legitimate or justified in a normative sense. It is very far from clear,
however, that r.'lere predictions about ho\v a j udge would be likely to
resolve a dispute are m general morally relevant to its actual
resolution. t 67
Seeing that follow ing the avenue of act ual ex pectations held little
prospect of success, the judge might try a d ifferent route. She might
thin k tha t she should introduce some stability into the legal environ ment
by comrnitting herself to follow ing her mvn precedents. She wo uld then
be inducing expectations , which vvould in consequence become justified
expectations. The question that then arises is t his: what kind of expectations should she induce? Thi s is the same as asking what kind of doctrine
of precedent shou ld be adopted . Since the j udge wo uld be proposing, in
effect , to defer to her own previous practical judgments, the issue can be
more accurately desc ribed in the following way: what kind of subjective
second- order reason should she act upon? She might consider, for example, that she should defer completel y to her own previous opinions,
which would amount to a decision to treat them as exclusionarily binding. W hile this approach would undoubtedly solve the predictability
problem, the judge would likely consider that it went too far in the opposite direction. It would sometimes require her to settle disputes in ways
-vvhich she was quite certain were wrong, since she would on at least some
occaswns be quite strongly con vinced that she had previously made a
mistake.
The obvious alternative is that the judge shou ld defer to her own
previous practical judgments by regard ing them as giving rise to
reweighting reasons, epistemically-bound ed reasons, or both. Suppose
she adopted the former approac h. She wou ld first decide whet her the
facts of the present case feli within the scope of the reasoning t hat she
had enunciated in some earlier case . If so, she could only rely on a modified (or completely different) formulation of reasons, representing her
current opinion on the issue in question, if their aggregate weight
appeared to her to exceed a threshold of strength which was higher to
some specified degree than what she wou ld ordinarily look upon as sufficient to tip the balance of reasons . Otherwise she would regard herself as
bound to make the decision that was indicated by the reasoning of the
167. Sec. e.g., Postema, Coordinalion and Com·enlion a1 !he Faunda!ians of Law, II J. LEGAL
STUD. 165, 180 (19 82); R. DwoRKIN, supra note 85 , at 14 1. Bu1 see infra note 174.
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precedent. In this way she would be introd ucing a deliberate and systemati c bias into her practical reasoning in favor of her ov.;n previous opin ions about what the objective balance of reasons req uires. Suppose, on
the other hand, that the judge opted for the epistemical ly-bounded
approach. T hen, if t he facts of the present case fell within the scope of
her reaso ning in an earlier case, she wo ul d be boun d to decide in the way
indicated by her prior reasoning unless her conviction that she had been
wrong rose above a certain epistemic threshold. Jn that event she would
be free and indeed obligated to deci de in accordance wi th her present
assessment of what the objective balance of reasons requires. In the case
of both ty pes of reasons the point would be to introduce a certain stability into the general legal environmen t wit hout at the same ti me sacrificing com pletely the judge's ability to decide cases according to her own
best present judgment.
T he effect of raising either the threshold that will tip one's subjective
assessm ent of the balance of reasons (on the reweighting approach) or
the epistemic threshold (on the epistemically-bounded approach) will in
each case be roughly the same. The probability will be increased that a
decision made on the basis of the raised threshold wi ll be correct (i.e. ,
will comply with the objective balance of reasons). I n the former case
this is because the stronger that the substanti ve arguments in favor of a
particula r result appear to be, the more likely it is that that result is the
correct one. Similarly, in the case of epistemically-bounded reasons, the
more strongly one is convinced that a particular decision is right, the
greater the likelihood that it is right. (These are em pirical generali zations, not conceptual truths.) The two ap proaches are in fact very closely
related to one another, and it might in practice be very diffic uit to draw a
clear distinction between them. As has just been indicated, both function
in roughly the same way. Each also gives rise to a variable th reshold
which can naturally be spoken of as att ributing a certain weight to the
practical judgment of another person, or, as in our present example, to
the practical judgment of oneself at a n earlier time. E ach can be said to
give rise to a presumption of varyin g st rengt h in favor of the practical
judgment of another. In the context of a doctrine of precedent both sorts
of reasons would probably be found together, and, because they both
operate in essentially the same way , there wo uld ordinaril y be no particular point in distinguishing between them. I shall therefore speak from
now on of the " non- exclusionary" con ception of precedent (to be contrasted with R az's exclusionary conception) with out generally bothering
to specify whether epistemically-bounded reasons, reweighting reasons,
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o r both are involved. 168 The threshold associated with each type of reason wi ll also be referred to indifferently as the weighti ng thr eshold.

3.

The !Von-Exclusionary Conception of Precedent:
Justifica tion and R efinem ent

In ado pting a non- exclusionary con ception of preced en i: the judge in
the single ·j udge system would be trying to ac hi ev ~ an acc::pt2ble degre;::
of predicta bility in her decisions while at the same time t ryin g to ens ure
that the overall level of correctness in her deci sionma king d id not suffer
too m uch as a result. T here is no reason to th ink that any one weighting
th reshold would provide the optimal solution to this p:coblern for ali
times, places, and types of dispute. A certain amoun t of t rial and error
on the part of the judge, and some give and take between judge and population over time, would probably be required in order t o find an effective
wo rking solution or set of solutions. 169 This fle xibility in fa ct seems t o
guarantee the superiority of the non-exclusionary over the exclusionary
conception of precedent, since the latter is really just a special case of the
former: if for some reason an exclusionary approach turned o ut to be the
preferable solution in a given set of circumstances, then it would presuma bly be adopted. 170
D uring this trial and error period people co uld legitirnately expect
that som e weight, although not necessarily a very clearly specified degree
of weight, would be attributed to the reasoning in previous cases. As
long as this was done they could not claim that their legitimate :: xpectations h ad been defeated just because a previous decision vvas not followed. O ver time, however, a number of more precisely delineated
16 8. I n Judicial Obl(gation, Precedent, and rhe Common L a w 1 referred to the non- exc lusionary
co ncepti o n of precede nt as th e strong Burkean concepti o n. Perry, supra no te 56, at 239. I d id no t,
h ow ever, exp ressl y d is tinguish in tha t paper between epistemica ll y- bound ed reaso n s a n d reweight ing
reasons. ha ving wron gly made the implicit assumption that th e fo rmer we re just a sub· ca tegory of
th e latt er. This was not, in li ght of the similar rol e th a t th e two type s of reason s p lay in lega l
reasonin g, a se ri o us e rro r. It did not in an y way und ermine th e m ain arg umen ts of th e pape r.
169. Cf R. DwoRKIN, supra note 85 , at 148-50 (di scussin g th e co ncept ion of law th a t he c~ ll s
pragmatism). The int erpretation of legal rea soning which I defend in this Pape r bears so me res emblance to the pragm a ti st approach to common law d ecisio nmaki ng. (Bur see infra no te 17 6.) No thin g l have to say s uppo rts the pragmatist understand ing of st a tut o ry inte rpre ta tion , ho wever.
170. Cf R. Dwo RKIN, supra note 85, a t 149-50. No tice th at, in the co nt ext of th e d isc ussion in
th e text. th e exclusi onary specia l case of a reweighting reason i:; a reason fo r the jud ge to giv e no
weight to her prese nt judgment o f what the obj ective ba la nce of reaso ns requires, an d hence to g ive
100 % we ight to he r ea rlier judgment. Th e exclusi o nary speci a l case of an epis temi cal ly- bo und ed
reason is a reason fo r the judge a lways to defer completely to her earlier jud gment n o ma tter how
st rongly she is con vin ced that on the previ ous occasio n she wa s w rong. T h ese tw o sort s o f sp ec ia l
cases are CO · exten sive.

1
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weighting thresholds, each applicable to a differen t situation, ·would no
doubt begin to crystallize. For example, the judge might conclude that
predictability o,vas m ote important, and hence that a higher th res hold
was calied for, where a line of reasonin g was represented by a series of
cases that h ad endured unchallenged for some time than v;here the rea.
.
' .
.
1
. .1.- ,
.
1
'
171
..., .
. .,
,
sorm1g u1 quesnon 'Nas assoc1atea vn tn a smg e recem case.· · ,)lm:i any,
she ;-nighi conclude: that the threshold shoul d va ry depending c'n the
natu te of the d isp ute. T he re lat ive importance of predictability v;ou!d
seem to be much greater fo r voluntary interactions of the sort exernplifiecl
by contract ual relations, for exam ple, than for involuntary interactions of
the sort exemplified by negligently caused accidents. I 72 As the degree of
weight t ha'L 'vvould be attributed under various circumstances w the reasoning in previous dec isio ns became clea rer, the legitimate expecta tions
of the population concerning th e manner in wh ich cases wou id be
decided would become more focu sed . I 7 3 But such expectation:; vvou ld
continue to be concerned with the process of decisionmaking as such, so
that, as before, the m ere fact that the judge decided a current case differentl y from how she had decided an earlier similar one would not necessarily mean that anyone's legitimate expectations had been fru strated . I 74
T he judge in our exam ple, in constructing a doctrine of precedent
along the lines sketched above, would be responding to certain diffic ulties
created by the fact that she was morally fallible. She wo uld be developing a strategy to d eal with her own moral uncertainty that called for h er
to defer, at least up to a point, to those of her previous practical judgments tha t she had made in her official capacity as a judge. There is thus
a fo rmal similarity to R az's analysis of authority, which outlines a
l 7 i. Cf J on es v. Sec ret ary o f Stat e for Social Servs., (1972] A.C. 944 , 993 (it is eJs icr to con clude that a recently d ecided case should no t be foll owed than a lo ng standing case).
172. Cf B rit ish T ra nsp . C omm' n v. Go u rley [1956] A.C. 185, 2 11-1 2.
173. As this occ urred it would becom e co rrespondingly hard er to modi fy the wei g ht in g t hresholds th at ha d been :;e lec ted. In o rde r not to upset leg itimate exp ec tations change mi ght ha ve to be
acco m plishd outsid e the cont ext of parti cul a r liti gat io n, for examp le, by iss uing a pr:.~ct ice ,;tatement. Th is is what was do ne by th e Eng li s h House of Lo rds wh en it dec id ed that it sho ul d no lo nge r
be absolut e ly bound by its previo us dec isio ns. See P ractice St atemen t [19 66] 3 All E.R. 77 .
174. T here are o f course situations wh ere it is more impo rt an t that there be a wa y of d o in g
things. whatever it is, tha n that things be done in a partic ular way. In su c h circums tances. th e fac t
that the re existed general expectat io ns in the co mmu n it y about ho w thin gs would bo:: done co ul d
afrect th e o bjec ti ve ba ia nce of reasons itself. T his would be tru e wh et her th ese expec tation s had bee n
ind uced by the legal syst em or had come abo ut in some ot her way . In such cases it is th e co nte xt in
which the expectations a rise, ra th er than th e fac t that they ha ve bee n delibera tel y ind uced and so a re
in that sense legi tim ate, that is impo rtant. T he anal ys is o f convent io ns as so lu tions to coord inati o n
problems sheds mu ch light on this issu e. S ee generally D. LEWI S, CONV ENTIOt'." : A P HI LOSOPHICAL STu DY ( 1969). Fo r relevant discussion s in th e lega l and pol iti ca l cont exts, see Gree n. Auilwriry
and Com·e111ion , 35 PH IL. Q. 329 ( 1985), a nd Postema, supra no te 167, a t 172-86.
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rational strategy instructing agents faced with practical uncertai nty to
dder under certain circumstances to the practical judgments of another
person . (T he fact that in the former case one defers to the judgme11tS of'
oneself at an earlier time while in the latter case one defers to the judg ..
ments of someone else is not a sign ificant difference.) The justifica tior1
fo r deference is quite di fferent in the two situations, howev er. In the case
of legitimate a utho rity , an agent should defer because it is re a s o nab l~ for
him to think that this \Vill increase the extent to which he com plies '>Vi t h
right reason. But in the case of precedent the judge presuma bly r1as no
particu lar grounds for believing that she will do better by d efer ring to h er
own prior opini ons. Her justification for deference is that her m o ral fallib ili ty and the concomitant poten ti al for unpredictability in her decisionmaking might create certain difficulties for other persons, in th e form of
uncertainty about how they should plan their lives, that can be at least
partially rectified by instituting a practice of following precedent.
The judge's general strategy is not just to ac hieve a degree of pred ictabi lity in her decisionmaking but also to ensure that the overall level
of correctness of her decisions does not suffer, or at least does not suffer
too much. She is most likely to make a success of this secon d aspect of
her strategy if on every occasion of dispute settlement, and hence in cases
falling within the scope of a precedent as well as in cases of first instance,
she is as familiar with the relevant first- order reasoning as possible. In
giving effect to a non- exclusionary doctrine of precedent she is simply
attributing, in the ways that have been explained, a certain presumpti ve
weight to the reasoning of her own prior decisions. In order to implement this doctr ine effectively she must still reassess the first- order arguments themselves, and the better she is at doing this the more successful
her overall strategy is likely to be. This is an instance in which reliance
on subjective second- order reasons, and on epistemically-bounded reasons in particular, seems to call for as extensive a familiari ty vvith the
underlying first- order reasoning as possible.
4.

lvfuiti-Tribuna! Systems

So far this discussion has assumed that the normative system under
consideration has never contained more than one judge . Suppose now
that the original judge retires and another one takes her place. It should
be apparent that this makes no difference to the analysis; the new judge
has exactly the same reasons for deferring (up to a point) to previous
judgments, whoever rendered them, as did the retired judge. Th e on ly
difference is that the implementation of a non- exclusionary conception of
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precedent must now be regarded as a strategy for dealing with moral
uncertainty on the pa rt of two persons and not just one.
Suppose next th at the simplifying assumption that there is only one
judge in the system at any one time is dropped. The introduction of a
non-e xclusionary doctrine of precedent into a system of absolute discretion that consists of severa l tri bunals can still be justified in the way ind icated above, but o niy if ce rtain furth er conditions are met. If each
tribunal simply trea ted the previous judg ments of both itself a nd all the
other tribunals as giving rise to reweighting or epistemically-bounded
reasons, then there would obviously be a possibility that lack of general
moral consensus could lead to inconsi stent decisions. This would not
only pose a potential th reat to predictability; it would also be a bad thing
in itself. If Dworkin is correct in his contention that the state is under a
special obligation to ac t towards its citizens in conformity with a principle of consistency or integrity, 175 then it cannot permit different tribunals
within a single system of di spute settlement to decide similar cases in
normatively inconsistent ways. It is therefore incumbent upon the various tribunals to be prepared at any given time to apply impartially a
single, comprehensive, and normatively consistent moral scheme to
whatever disputes might arise in the community. (This does not mean
that the scheme cannot change over time; government must speak with
one voice, but there is nothing objectionable in principle if it changes its
mind about what it is saying.) 176
The best method for achieving the goal of systemic normative con sistency would be the creation of a judicial hierarchy. A single highest
tribunal would conform to a non- exclusionary conception of precedent
in very much the same way that the single judge did in the hypothetical
adjudicative regime described earlier. Lower tribunals would generally
follow a non-exclusionary doctrine as well, but one that was increasingly
more restrictive as one moved down the hierarchy: the lower the tribunal, the higher the we ighting thresholds that would apply to it. (It would
i 75 . S ee R . DWORKI N, supra no te 85, es peciall y chs. 6, 7. F o r a succ in ct statem ent o f the
int eg rity prin c iple, see id. a t !65-66.
17 6. In supra no te 169, I draw attenti o n to th e fact th a t the int erpretati on of co mmon la w
reasonin g th a t is d efended in th is Pape r is sim ila r in ce rtain res pects to the conception o f la w whi c h
Dwo rkin labels pragmatism . The recog niti o n of a prin c iple of co nsistency or int egrity di stingui shes
m y ve rsion of adjud icativi srn from pr ag mati sm , how ever. Th e interpretation of the co mmon la w
whi c h I ad va nce in thi s Pa per is, l be li e ve, co nso na nt in all essenti a l res pec ts with th e th eore ti ca l
charac terizati o n that the comm o n law shoul d receiv e und er Dw o rkin' s preferred conc eption of la w,
w hi c h he ca ll s law as integrit y. But I shall not arg ue in suppo rt of that con clu sion here, sin ce it
wo ul d 1·equire a rath er in volved d isc uss io n o f th e impo rt a nce whi c h Dwo rkin asc ribes to consistency
with the pasr, as opposed to co nsist ency of th e sort d esc ribed in the tex t.
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also be true, however, th at the less drastic the proposed changes, the
lowe r the relative threshold.) L ower tribu nals would be bound in an
exclusionary sense not to int rod uce norma tive inconsistencies in to th e
gene ral moral scheme, and they would be sim ilarly bound not to overru le
the decisions of tribunals higher than themsel ves in the h ierarchy. (An
overruli ng is sim ply a restatement of the m ora l principles a pp licable to a
particular type of d ispute w hich is sufficient ly d rastic as necessa rily to
1mply that an earlier case would now be decided different ly.) I n cer tain
very limited respects, therefore, the doctrine of preceden t would , for reasons of systemic consistency, place exclusionary constra ints on lower
courts. There would always be a standing possibility, however, that any
given case could go on appeal, so it is the character of the judicial reasonin g in the highest court, where the non- exclusionary d octrine of preced ent would have unfettered effect, that is of greatest significance in
assessing the theoretical nature of the system .

5.

The N ature of Non-Exclusionary Systems

T he hierarchical system of tribunals that was described in the previous section will be referred to as a non- exclusionary system, and the
tribunals themselves will henceforth be called courts. Does a non-exclusionary system retain the adjudicativist character of a system of absolute
discretion? There are a number of reasons for concluding that the
answer to this question is yes.
F irst, the system continues to settle dispu tes on the basis of exactly
the same sorts of moral considerations as before: 177 it simply gives a
certain presumptive weight to the reasoning of previous decisions. Second, the courts constantly stay in touch , so to speak, wi th th e u ltimate
fi rst-order reasoning which is the subject of the presumptive weighting
process. In the single-j udge system discussed above it was a distinct
advantage that the judge possess as thorough an understanding of the
first - order considerations as possible, and the same is obviously true of
the highest court in the non- exclusionary system . But even those courts
which are exclusionarily bound in certain res pects by the decisions of
courts h igher than themselves in the judicial hierarch y will constantly be
engaged in qualifying and modifying the reasoning that was relied upon
in previous similar cases, although their room for maneuver is much less
than that of the highest court. H ere too the system as a whole will benefit if the lower court judges are as fam iliar as possible w it h the lines of
first- order reasoning that have been relied upon as rationales for previous
177.

Mo re will be said a bo ut thi s poi nt infra , in th e text acco m panyi ng no tes 201-35.
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decisions (as wel l as with those, it should be added, which they think
sho ul d have been relied upon but were not).
A third poi nt, which is related to the first two , is that it is possible to
maintain a degree of overa ll predictability in the decisionmaking of t he
non· exclusiona ry system, as well as to achie ve general no:c::nat ive consistenc y a.rnong the d ispute sett ling standard s t hat the couns are p repared
to app ly at any gi ven tin;e, without insisting that there must be a clear
distinction bet ween the iden tification and the assessment of th e reasoning
in earli er cases . The non- exclusion ary concep tion of precedent a ttributes
a certain p resumpti ve ;,veight to t he reasoning of previous decisions, but
it does not p resuppose that t he identification of th a t reason ing w ill itself
be value free. O ften it will be necessary to reconstruct the argu m ents of a
previous decision, relying unavoidably on one's own moral sensibilities in
the process, in order just to arrive at a clear understanding of them.
Thus even though it is tru e that the rendering of a judicial decision and
the giving of reasons in su p port of it are social facts, th ere is no warrant
for the ass ump tion that the courts of the non-exclusiona ry system must
comply with anything like the sources thesis when they identify the reasoning of earlier similar cases.
T h e above considerations provide strong support for the conclusion
that the non-exclusionary system is best understood in adjudicativist
rat her than in positivist terms . Perhaps it might be objected, however,
t hat the concern for stability or predictability that wou ld justify the
ad option of a no n- exclusionary doctrine of precedent is a for ward looking con sideration that has no moral bearing on the resolution of any dispute arising prior to the doctrine's implementation. While t he general
need for p redictabi lity would obviously have antedated th is event, t here
would have been no mechanism for legitimizing and focusing expectations in a way that wo uld make them morally relevant to t he resolution
of existing disputes. T he point of introducing a doctrine o f precedent is
to provide some ki nd of future guidance for ordinary citizens, and that
seems to be more of a positivist th an an adjudicativist notion.
This objection is really two related objections that have been rolled
into one. T he first is that the introduction of any doctrine of precedent,
even a non- exclusionary one, is inconsistent with adjudicativism. T he
second is that the introduction of even a non- exclusionary doct rin e of
precedent can only be explained in positivist terms. T hese will be considered in turn .
The basic p remise of the first of the two sub- objections is that the
justification for complying with a doctrine of precedent does not itself
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figure among the reasons that are morally relevant to the resolution of
exi sting disputes. It is then inferred that the courts, in implementin g a
doctrine of precedent in a system of absolute discretion, would at least
initially-an d perhaps subsequently-be deciding cases inconsistently
with adjudicativi sm . This argument's premise is true, but the argumr::nt
itse lf is unsound . Con sider again the system \vith a single judge. In
choosing to treat her eariier opinions as gi ving rise to reweighting or epistem ically-bound ed reasons, the judge is not deciding against resolving
the present case in accordance with an assessment of what is req uired by
th e objective bala nce of reasons; she is simply deciding to resolve it on
the basis of her previous assessment rather than her present one. By the
ve ry nature of epistemically-bounded and reweighting reasons, however,
the judge is not strongly convinced that her present opinion is correct, or
at least she does not feel that the substantive arguments as she now perceives them amount to an overwhelming case. 17 8 When moral disagreement either with oneself at an earlier time or with another person is of
this relatively mild sort, however, there does not seem to be an y good
reason for thinking that one will do particularly better overall (i.e. , make
more correct judgments) by always acting on one's present opinion . 179
Hence there is no tension between the function of the judge as understood in adjudicativist terms and the implementation of a non- exclusionary doctrine of precedent. Since taking the latter step would bring
significant moral benefits of its own, that is what the judges of a system of
absolute discretion should do.
178 . Cf F itzl ee t Esta tes Ltd . v. Ch erry, [ 1977] 3 All E . R. 99 6, 999 (acc ordin g to Lo rd W il berfo rce, th e majority a nd min orit y opinion in a previous case represe nt ed "two emin ently poss ib le
vi ews," ' and it required ··mu c h m o re than doubts" about th e co rrectness of the earlier dec isio n to
justify departing from it).
179. If there are a nu mber o f previous judicial opini o ns whi c h a!I come to a conclusio n di fferent
fr om the one that the prese nt judge is inclined to favor, th en an ana logy with a result in th e th eo ry o f
mJjo rit y rule will sup po rt a strength ened version o f thi s point. This is so, at least , if the ea rl ier
o pini o ns were arri ved a t ind epe nd entl y of one another , a nd if th e indi vidu a l judges arc in genera l
more lik ely to be ri ght th a n wro ng abo ut a given iss ue. A s Arthur K ufiik points o u t, p ro bab ilit y
theory yie lds the foll o win g resul t:
If a randoml y se lected vo ter is m o re likel y to be ri ght th a n wrong in his judgme n t a bo ut a
matter which is up fo r a vo te, then the probabilit y that a judgment whi c h is inde pend ently
a rr iv ed at by a maj o ri ty o f such voters is th e correc t judgm ent is greater th a n the
probability that th e judgm ent of a randomly selected voter is co rrect. Thus voters wh o fi nd
themselves in the min o rity in suc h circumstances have, in virtu e of that , some reaso n to
regard their own opini o n as less probably correct than th e m ajority opinion.
K uflik. J'v!ajorily Rule Procedure, in DuE PROCESS (NOMOS XVIII) 296, 305 (J.R. Penn oc k & J .W.
C hap man eds. 1977). By way of illustration Kuflik stat es th a t if a n ave rage voter is onl y sli ghtl y
mo re li kely to be co rrec t th a n no t, sa y 51 percent lik e ly, th en the probability th a t a 5 1 perce nt
major ity is co rrect in its jud gm ent is 51. 99 percent wh en 100 perso ns a re vo ting, 59.8 perce n t when
500 pe rso ns are votin g, a nd 69 pe rcent when 1.000 perso ns a re votin g.
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The second sub- objection is that the introduction of even a nonexclusionary doctrine of p recedent provid es guidance for the general
popul<:nion, and this is a p henomenon that can only be u nd erstood in
positivist term s. If, ho wever, the guidance provided were only of an
indeterminate, non-exclusionary sort-if, in other words, the system
only gave citizens fi rst- order reasons for action-t hen the objection
seems to corne to nothing, especially in light of the considerations dis··
cussed in the preceding paragra ph. A positivism tha t tried to build upon
such a found a tion wo uld be appropriating the label without the substance; certainly it would bear no resemblance to Raz's version of positivism. But perhaps Raz might wish to argue that even if an adjudicativist
interpretati on of the non-exclusionary system is preferable as far as the
courts' own internal reasoning processes are concerned, the system must
nonetheless be understood as generating standards which are exclusionarily binding on citizens if not on courts. This is a more robust version of
the second objection, and the response to it will be deferred until later.

6.

The Nature of the Common Law

I have presented arguments elsewhere which show that Raz's positivist interpretation of the common law is an inadequate one and that t he
best theoretical understanding of modern common law systems regards
them as being, in effect, non-exclusionary systems of the sort described
above. 180 T hese arguments will not be repeated here. Instead, four
related conclusions concerning the common law doctrine of precedent
which are supported by those arguments will be set out, together with a
few further observations about the theoretical character of the common
law.
First, the non- exclusionary conception of precedent i·s better able to
explain the nature and extent of what Raz calls the special revisability of
the common law than is the exclusionary conception; Raz's idea that
common la\v preced ents give rise to rules which are exclusionarily binding " in their essential rati onale" 181 fails to correspond very closely to the
fact s. Second, R az' s explanation of the practice in common law courts
concerning overruling is also descriptively inaccurate. Raz says that
there is a "permissible list" of reasons to overrule which fall outside the
scope of an exclusionary rule requiring courts to treat preceden ts as
180. See Perry, supra note 56. at 239-55; see also supra note 168 concerning a slight difference
between the understanding of the non-exclusionary conception of precedent that I advanced in the
earlier paper and the one that I am putting forward here.
181. J. R.·\Z. supra note 3, at 189.
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exclusionarily binding. 1 ~c But the English H ouse of Lords, for example,
tends to require that a decision being reconsidered be "clearly wrong" 183
before it can be overruled, or that there be "a very good reason" 1 " 4 to
overrule, rather than that t he reasons which led to the reconsideration be
of one or another sort. 185 T he first of these phrases suggests an episterni'
. 1 re2.son., \Vmle
' .,
. h .
ca111 y-ooundeu
the
second• suggests a revvelg_
tmg reaso0.;
neither is very plausibly und erstood as presupposing the existence of c\i1
exclusionary reason.
T he third point l S that the non- exclusionary conception of prece ..
dent, because it allows for c. r:'nge of possible weighting t hresholds, is
able to account for the fact that common law "rules" are generally spoken of as being settled or established to a greater or lesser degree: rz;ther
than as being valid or invalid in the ali-or-nothing, positivist sense. Sirnilarly, the non-exclusionary conception can make sense of the \vay in
which judges and lawyers refer to precedents as possessing "weight" or
" authority," these being, again, varia.ble rather than all- or-nothing concepts. The exclusionary interpretation of precedent is incapable of
accounting for either of these facts. The fourth point is that the nonexclusionary approach, unlike the exclusionary understanding, can offer
a unified theory of the general common law practice of following precedent. At the same time it can explain why some jurisdictions, for example England, are said to have a relatively "strict" doctrine of precedent
while others, such as those in the United States, are said to have less
strict versions. 186 As before, these differences are explained by the fact
182. !d. at 114.
183. Firzleer, (1977] 3 All E.R. at 1000: O'Brien v. Robinson, [1973] A.C. 912,930: Jon es·;.
Secretary of State for Social Sen·s, [1972] A. C. 944, 993.
184. Knuller Ltd. v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [ 1973] A.C. 435, 455.
185. In Judicial Ob!igarion, Precedcnl, and rhe Common Law l discuss the official position of the
House of Lords, during the period 1898-1966, that it could not overrule its own previous decisions.
Perry, supra note 56, at 244-~'7. As is made clear in A. PATERSON, THE LAW LORDS 122-53 (!982),
the members of the House of Lords eventually came to think :hat this practice was a mistaken one.
In Devlin, Judges and Lawmakers, 39 llil oD. L. REV. 1, 13 (1976), Lord Devlin wrote that the rule
was "utterly antagonistic to the spirit of the common law." In its 1966 Practice Statement, supra
note 173, the court gave notice that henceforth it would "depart from a former decision when it
appears right to do so." For a good discussion of the nineteenth century transition in the English
judicial system from what was clearly a non- exclusionary conception of precedent (according to
which, in the words of one judge writing in 1833, earlier decisions need not be followed "if plainly
unreasonable and inconvenient") to a much stricter and more rigid conception, see Evans, Change in
rhe DoCirine of Precedenl During rhe Nineleenrh Cenrury, in PRECEDENT IN LAW 35 (L Goldstein
ed. 1987).
186. See, e.g., P.S. ATIYAH & R.S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERiCA c;
LAw ch. 5 (1987), especially at 119 (the version of srare decisis which prevails in England today is
very strict by modern American standards), and 126-27 (the overall authoritative force or weight of
a precedent is generally not so great in America as in England); Goodhart, Case Law in England and
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that the non- exclusionary conception allows for a range of possible
weighting thresholds.
A couple of further observations are in order here. F irst, it is not
open to Raz to say that the " clearly wrong" language \vhich common
law courts sometimes employ to describe their criterion for overruling
simply represents a minimal epistemic limitation which i~; consistent with
even the highest courts being exclusionarily bound by their own previous
decisions. It is true that common law courts, especially in England, often
apply a relatively high weighting threshold to overruling, but this is
because overruling ordinarily involves a fairly dras tic restatement of
common law principles. The higher courts are constantly engaged in
modi fying and restating the common law in ways that are much more
modest in effect, however, and th is practice is best understood by reference to the idea of lower weighting thresholds that have been adopted
within the framework of a non- exclusionary conception of precedent.
The activities of lower courts must often be understood in similar terms.
A non- exclusionary conception of precedent can provide a unified
account of all the various ways in \vhich the common law is judicially
revised and qualified. As a result, there is little to be said for isolating the
practice of overruling in particular and then trying to reconcile it with an
exclusionary conception of precedent.
A second observation is related to the first. Common law courts
describe their main criterion for overruling in language wh ich sometimes
suggests an epistemically-bounded reason, sometimes a reweighting reason, and sometimes both. Examples of the first t\vo categories of expressions have already been given from the House of Lords. An exam ple of
the third category from the same court is this: a long established line of
decisions will be overruled "only in plain cases where serious inconvenience or injustice would follow" from not overruling. 187 This apparent
indifference on the part of the courts to which of the two types of reasons
is in play is at one level undoubtedly due to their not being aware that
there is a technical distinction to be drawn here. But in light of our
Amenca, 15 CORNELL L.Q. 173, 179-86 (1930); Hardisty. The Effecl of Fulure Orientation on the
American Reformulation of English Judicial Method. 30 HASTINGS L.J. 523. 532 ( 1979) (American
courts give less weight to precedent than English courts). It should be noted that Atiyah and Summers argue that the different judicial treatment accorded to precedents in England and the United
States is illustrative of a more general thesis according to which '"form::ll'" reasoning is relied upon
more widely than ··substantive" reasoning in the English legal system, whereas in the American
system the reverse is true. P.S. ATIYAH & R.S. SUMMERS, supra. at 1, 32. The distinction which
Atiyah and Summers draw between substantive and formal reasons is very similar to Raz's distinction between first- order and exclusionary reasons. !d. at l-2.
187. Admiralty Comm'rs v. Valverda, [1938] A.C. 173. 194 (emphasis added).
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earlier conciusion that each of these types of reason serves roughl y the
same purpose and functions in much the same way, the judicial practice
of relying on both of them and sometimes combining th e t 1.vo is in any
event an understandable and probably a sensible one. If common law
courts employ re\veighting as well as epistemicall y~boun ded reasons,
however, then that further weakens any case there might b::: for explicatin g overruling from the perspective of an exclusionary conception of precedent. Reweighting reasons, unlike epistemically -bounded reasons,
cannot be understood as a special case of exclusionary reasons: rather
the reverse is the case.
If modern common law regimes are best understood as non-exclusionary systems, then in light of the comments about such systems that
were made in the preceding section the best theoretical interpretation of
the common law is an adjudicativist one. Common law judges do not
decide cases on the basis of-or at least are not themselves bound bypositive, pre- existing exclusionary rules, but rather look to whatever
moral principles are properly applicable to resolve disputes of the kind in
question. Deciding cases in accordance with such principles is their most
fundamental obligation. In order to ensure a certain measure of predictability in the legal environment courts attribute a varying presumptive
weight to the reasoning of past decisions, thereby maintaining a kind of
systematic continuity with the past, but not in such a way that they ever
lose touch with the relevant first- order reasons.

It is true that at any given time there is associated with the common
law process a relatively stable body of dispute settling standards or
"rules." (The term "rules" is here to be understood in a broad, generic
sense that includes, but is not limited to, Raz's notion of an exclusionary
rule.) If the adjudicativist interpretation of the common law process is
correct, however, then these standards are not exclusionary rules, as Raz
maintains; rather they are presumptions about how particular types of
disputes should be settled, where the notion of a "presumption" is to be
explained in terms of reweighting and/or epistemically-bounded reasons.
The term " common law" is sometimes used to refer to this body of standards as it exists at any particular moment, but in a more fundamental
sense it is understood as denoting the dynamic, institutionalized process
of rational dispute settlement itself. The adjudicativist interpretation of
the common law, which takes its basic point or function to be the settlement of disputes in accordance with appro priate requirements of morality, is simpiy an attempt to capture this general unde rstanding within a
theoretical framework.
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I have argued elsewhere that an adjudicativist interpretation of the
common law which incorporates the non-exclusionary conception of precedent both clarifies and partially vindicates the theory of law that
underlay Dworkin's early papers "The Model of Rules I" and " T he
Model of R ules II. " 188 It not only permits a more precise formulation of
Dworkin's no tion of institutional support, but also clarifies his rejection
of a picture of "existing law" according to which " the law of a comrnunity is a distinct collection of particular rules and principles ... such that
it is a sensible question to ask whether, at any given moment, a particular
rule or principle belongs to that collection." 189 I shall no t further elaborate on these claims here. 190 Instead, I shall briefly dra\.v attention to the
fact that th,~ modern debate over the nature of the common law between
positivist and adjudicativist theorists is no more than the contemporary
version of a much older controversy.
Gerald Postema has shown in an important recent book that the
common law tradition which flourished in the late sixteenth and early
seventeenth centuries constituted a theory of law which was, in the terminology of this Paper, essentially adjudicativist in nature. 191 Coke, for
example, wrote that "Reason is the life of the law, nay the Common Law
itself is nothing else but Reason," 192 and Hale said that judicial decisions
" do not make a Law properly so called ... yet they have a great Weight
and Authority in Expounding, Declaring, and Publishing what the Law
of this Kingdom is .... " 193 Hobbes, writing in the positivist tradition,
replied to Coke that the common law was not law at all because " [i]t is
not Wisdom, but Authority that makes a Law," 194 adding that "Statutes
are not philosophy as is Common Law and other disputable Arts, but are
Commands or Prohibitions .... " 195 Bentham later followed Hobbes in
188,

R, DwORKIN . RIGHTS, supra note 93, at 14-80; see Perry, supra note 56, at 223-26, 254-55,

189. K D\VORK!N, RIGHTS, supra note 93, at 343; see also id, at 76. 292 (criticizing the characterization of law as a set of fixed standards),
190, I shall simply note that Dworkin's essay Hard Cases, in R, DwoRKIN, RIGHTS. supra note
93, at 81-130, represents something of an aberration in his work, since he seems to accept there an
exclusiom~ry conception of precedent. See Perry, supra note 56, at 255 n, 133,
19 L

G, PosTEMA, supra note 94,

192, E, COKE,! It-iST!TUTES, § 21, quoted in G, POSTEMA, supra note 94, at 7, "Reason'• here
does not mean individual reason, since the early common law tradition largely accepted what Postema calls ••the tradition- shaped sense of reasonableness." ld, at 10, This is a distinctive element in
what is nonetheless a recognizably adjudicativist approach,
193, M , HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 45 (CM, Gray 3rd ed,
1971), q!wied in G, PosTD,JA, supra note 94, at 9,
194, T. HOBBES, A DIALOGUE BETWEEN A PHILOSOPHER AND A STUDENT OF THE COMMON
LAWS 55 (l Cropsey ed, 1971), quoted in G. PoSTEMA, supra note 94, at 47.
195,

T HoBBES. supra note 194, at 69,
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refusing to accord the status of law to the common law. 196 As Postema
and H.L.A . Hart have both recently pointed out, the guiding thought
behind H obbes' claim that all laws are commands is the notion of "an
authoritative, peremptory directive to action." 19 7 One of the great merits
of Raz's conception of a second-order exclusionary reason is that it
makes it pos:;ible to analyze in clear and precise term:; the related concepts of authority and of a perem ptory directive, both of which have fig··
ured so prominentl y in the positivist tradition . 1n
R az, li ke Hart, represen ts something of a break with the older positivist tradition in that both he and Hart try to make sense of the common
law in positivist terms rat her than simply rejecting it, as H obbes an d
Bentham did , as not being law at all. Raz's attempt in th is regard is
unsuccessful , and a similar conclusion would apply to Hart's more abbreviated discussion of the common law. 199 It is, moreover, Raz's own conception of a (subjective) second- order reason, once it has been refined to
yield the categories of reweighting and epistemically-bounded reasons,
that makes it possible to offer a similarly precise analysis of the idea that
previous judicial decisions "carry weight and authority " and that they
give rise to " presumptions" rather than to strict rules. T hese notions,
which figured prominently in the older common law tradition and which
are still frequently relied upon in expositions of the doctrine of precedent,200 can be explicated within the non-exclusionary conception of precedent in such a way as to make an adjudicativist interpretation of the
common law quite plausible.
196. See. e.g., J. BENTHAM, Papers Rela1ive 10 Codificalion and Public l miruClion, in 4 THE
WORKS OF JEREMY BENTH.-\M 451 (J. Bowring ed . 1843). Bentham's cla im tha t the common law is
not law is discussed in G. POSTE MA, supra note 94, at 286-30 1, and in Simpson, The Common L aw
and Legal Theory , in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDEN CE 77, 88 -9 1 (A. Simpson ed. 1973).
19 7. Postema, Som e R oo1s of our Notion of Preced ent, in PRECE DENT IN L Aw 9, 13 (L. Go ld ·
stein ed . 1987) (emphasis deleted); see also H. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM 2 53-54 ( 19 82) (exp la in ing Hobbes' view o f the peremptory c haracter of commands).
198. Bentham would see m to be the great exception to tht genera l posi tivist tradi ti on o f pl ac in g
perempto ry d irec ti ves at th e hea rt of th e co ncep t of law. Accord in g to Poste ma , Be ntham w ished to
subject practical reaso nin g to a rati onal reconstruction which wo uld purge it of all excl usio nary o r
peremptory "d isco nti nui ti es," so that o ffi c ia ls and indi vidu a ls a like wou ld engage in direc t-utilit aria n
reaso ning o nl y (an d the refore, in Razian terms , in fir st- o rder reasoni n g o nl y) . S ee G. POSTEMA,
supra note 94, at 319; see generally id. at 317-28 . Postema states tha t Bentham was thus led "to
adop t a conception of lega l rules quite different from what we have co m e to expect from positi vist
lega l theory.·· !d. at 3 18. H e goes on to say that "Benth am m ight be sa id to have erected a concepti o n of law which rejects the noti on o f authority .... " l d. at 32 7.
199 . See H. HART, THE Co:-JCEPT OF LAW 131- 32 ( 1961) (common law rul es are esse nti a ll y
similar in nature to ot her kinds o f !ega! rules) .
200. See, e.g. , supra note 186. See also R. D woRKIN, supra note 85, at 24-2 6; Moore, Precedent,
supra note 154, at 189-90. Afte r fir st developing a holi sti c acco unt of the com mon law, Moore
mak es 1he intriguin g cla im th a t ultim a tely it is o nl y in a psycholog ica l sense tha t precedents ca n be
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Morally R elevant Reasons and Forward-Looking Exclusionary
Rules

It was mentioned earlier that R az might argue that even if the
judges v;ho make and apply the common law are not themselves exclusionarily bound by it, common law standards none theless provide exclusionary guidance for citizens. The result would simply be an asymmetry
between the: manner in which the common law binds citizens and the
manner in which it binds courts. On this view judges, or at least the
judges of the highest courts of appeal, have powers to modify the standards of the common law which are sufficiently broad that they cannot
be said to be exclusionarily bound by those standards, while citizens are
so bound until such time as the standards are judicially modified. The
response to this objection will concentrate on the example of private
common law, which is not only the heart of the common law but also the
subject matter upon \vhich most adjudicativist theories focus. This section is concerned with certain conceptual preliminaries, and it is only in
the following section that the objection proper will be considered.

It was assumed earlier that in the transformation of a system of
absolute discretion into a non-exclusionary system the courts would continue to settle disputes on the basis of exactly the same sorts of moral
considerations as before. These considerations, which will henceforth be
referred to as morally relevant reasons, are supposed to be the reasons
that would figure in the objective balance of reasons so as to yield the
correct moral solution to the dispute before the court. Opinions as to
what these considerations are wi il of course differ, but plausible candidates include any relevant moral rights and duties of the litigants, for
example, rights of reparation in tort cases, and perhaps the moral rights
and duties of certain third parties as well. But morally relevant reasons
need not in theory be limited to what Dworkin calls arguments of principle (although particular versions of adjudicativism, such as Dworkin's
said to have a holding to which a certain weight is attached. !d. at 211-12. It will not be possible to
discuss that claim here. It should be noted that it is not just adjudicativists who conceive of precedents in terms of weight and/or presumptions. Neil MacCormick, for example, who identifies himself as a positivist, nonetheless says that "precedents are best treated as more or less highly
persuasive rather than absolutely binding," by which he means that they should be regarded as
giving rise to strong presumptions in favor of what has already been decided. See MacCormick, Why
Cases Have Rationes and What These Arc, in PRECEDENT IN LAw, supra note 197, at !55, I 58, 167.
This view of precedent undermines MacCormick's claim to be a positivist, however, at least so far as
the common law is concerned, and, together with his emphasis on the role of courts as disputeresolving agencies, see id. at 167-69, brings him perilously close to an adjudicativist conception of
law.
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rights thesis, will make this claim). 201 At least certain sorts of policy
arguments, such as loss-spreading and deep-pocket arguments in tort
cases, could be regarded, depending on the moral and political theory
which on e held, as morally relevant reasons as well: action on the basis
of such reasons is an attempt to make a moral difference for the better, in
consequentialist terms, with respect to the facts of the very case before
the court. 202
M orally relevant reasons can be "forward-looking" as well as " backward-looking." A court might have reason to conclude, for example,
that deciding a certain case in a certain way would lead people to expect
similar decisions in the future; if such expectations cou ld foreseeably lead
to undesirable behavior, then the court wo uld have a reason (although
not necessarily a conclusive one) to decide the case the other way. This
could be true even in a system of absolute discretion/ 03 and the effect
would be amplified where a doctrine of precedent had been adopted.
Even if an exclusionary doctrine of precedent were in place the court
would not, if it decided the case with a view to discouraging the undesirable behavior, be laying down an exclusionary rule to be followed by the
persons whose possible future conduct was giving rise to concern. It
would simply be taking account of the possible harmful consequences of
deciding the present case one way rather than another, where the existence or extent of those consequences could be affected by the general
knowledge that subsequent similar cases would probably be decided in a
similar way. It is quite conceivable that those persons whose potentially
objectionable conduct posed concern in the first place might not even be
the subjects of whatever exclusionary rule was to emerge from the court's
decision. 204
Contrast the kind of forward-looking consideration just discussed
•.vith the laying down of what will be referred to asfont>ard-looking exciusionary rules. A forward-looking exclusionary rule is a standard
201.

R. DWORKIN, RIGHTS, supra note 93, at 82-84.

202.

See G.

CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS

39-45 (1970).

203. Taking account of such arguments in a system of absolute discretion would not amount to
treating bare expectations themselves as being morally relevant to the resolution of the dispute, in
the way I said supra in the text accompanying note 167 would be problematic. It would be a case of
taking account of the morally undesirable consequences which would be likely to flow from people
having the bare expectations that they did.
204. See. e.g., Ronde] v. Worsley, [ 1969] 1 A.C 191, in which the House of Lords held that a
barrister could not be held liable to his client in negligence, primarily on the ground that allowing
such actions against barristers might have the effect of inhibiting them in the performance of their
duties to the court. Even if one thinks that House of Lords cases give rise to exclusionary rules, the
only possible subjects of such a rule here are the clients of barristers, not the barristers themselves.
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intended to provide exclusionary guidance fo r citizens bu t wh ich at the
sam e time does not bear in any direct way on the moral resol ution of
existing d isp utes. T he prima ry justification fo r its adoption lies, rather,
in th.:: fact that it creates a new exclusionary reason for action which ,
while it reflects what Raz calls dependent reasons, does so because people
wou ld no t otherwise be in a position to act on th ose reasons in t he
absenc-e; of a publicly-adopted rule. 205

Fen· example, suppose that peo ple's m orol rights in cases of accidentally c::w sed loss are determined by a standard of care that d efines un ac-ceptable risks without reference to the cost of avoiding the risk, so that
where har m is reasonably foreseeable a substantial risk sim ply ough t not
to be irn posed on another person. Thi s und ersta nding of the negligence
stand ard was ad vanced by Lord R eid in the E nglish case of Bolton v.
S ton e.20 6 A n altern ative formulation of the standard of care is based on
the Lea rned Hand test, which balances the expected risks to the plaintiff
agai ns t the cost to the defendant of taking precautions to a void the
risk. 207 Suppose it is true, as Richard Posner has argued, 20 8 that the
H and test would, if complied with by the bulk of the population, lead to
the socially optimal level of accident occurrence, i.e. , to an optimal balance between accident costs and costs of accident avoidance. A court
which applied the Lord Reid formulation of the standard of care in a
case of first instance would be basing its decision on morally relevant
reasons, since it would be deciding the case on the basis of the moral
rights and duties of the litigants. But a court which accepted the
Learned H and test in a case of first instance, saying that people would be
held liable in negligence if and only if they failed to ta ke the economically
desira ble preca ution s,209 would be adoptin g a forward- looking exclusionary ru le. T he rule would reflect reasons whi ch peopl e alread y had ,
narnei y reasons to make society economically effic ient, but prior to its
ado pt ion they would not have been in a pos ition , due either to ignora nce
or to the pointlessness of action by one individual alone, to act upon
205. fo rwa rd -l oo kin g exclu sionary rules will oft en affect th e objective bala nce of reaso ns itself.
S ee supra no te 5 1 an d ac co mpa nying text.
206. B olion [ 19 51] A.C. 850, 867. This is the u ndersta ndin g of th e stand ard of ca re in negli gence la w wh ic h is gen era ll y acce pted in England a nd the Co mm o nwea lth.
207. In U.S. v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 f.2d 169 (1 947) Judge H a nd held th a t a person is
neg li ge n t if th e cost o f ta k ing ad eq uat e preca uti o ns is less tha n wh a t th e cost of the injury wo ul d be.
we re it to occ ur, d iscount ed by the pro bability of its occ urren ce . I d iscuss the Lo rd R eid and
Learn ed H and formu lati o ns of th e st a ndard of ca re in Perry . Th e l mpossibili1y of General SlnCI
Liabifily , 1 C.\ N . J. L. & J U RIS. 147, 169-71 (1 988).
208. S ee, e.g., P os n er, A Th eory Negligen ce, i J. LEGAL ST U D . 29 ( 1972).
209. F or si m p li ci ty' s sa ke I am ign o rin g the complicat io ns that a re c rea ted by con trib utory
!lcglige ncc, sinc e these a re not relevant to th e exam ple.
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those reasons .210
I t is the contention of this P aper that private la w cases characteristically are and should be decided by common lav.; courts on rhe basis of
morall y relev<mt reasons alone. T his is , in a sense, a generalization of
Dworkin's rights thesis. 211 R az, on the other hand , is commi tted by his
positivist interpretation of the common law to the position that common
la.w courts
and should decide at least some casss
adopti ng fo rward -·
looki ng exclusion ary rules. T his follows from his cl airn th at courts conunregu lated cases "act and should act j ust as legislators do,
fronted
namely, they should adopt those rules which the;· j ud ge best, " 212 since it
is obviously wi thin the prerogative of a legislature to enact forward-looking exclusionary rules. This dispute is in part an empirical one, but it
will not be possible to resolve satisfactorily that aspect of the issue he re.
The following section will therefore come to grips -with the question of
whether the common law gives rise to exclusionary rules for citizens by
considering, in turn, first the possibility that the contention advanced
above is correct, and then the possibility that Raz's position is correct.
Before these two possibilities are examined, however, there is one
dimension of the empirical question which deserves to be briefly d iscussed. Behavior-guiding considerations are very strongly emphasized in
modern American tort law and tort scholarship, especially in the area of
product liability. 213 Tort law in the United States is very different in this
respect from tort law in the rest of the common law world, which places
much greater emphasis on fairness considerations .214 It was mentioned
above that morally relevant reasons can sometimes be forward-looking in
nature, but A merican courts deciding product liability cases are oft en
concerned with more than just the future ramificatio ns of p resent d ecisions. Sometimes the main intention of a decision appears to be to produce an effect on the future conduct of potential d efendants. Perhaps it
is possible, therefore, that modern American tort la\v, or at least product
liability lo.w, constitutes an exception to the general contention that common law courts do and should decide cases on the basis of morall y relevant reasons alone. If so, then the fa ct that retroactive overruling
continues to represent the general practice in tort cases in the U nited
210.

Cf J. RAZ, supra note 3, at 247-48.

211.

R. DWORKIN, RIGHTS, supra note 93, at 82-84.

212.

J. RA Z, supra note 3, at 197.

213.

See. e.g., Schwartz, New Products, Old Products, Evolving Law. Retroaclive Law , 58
REV. 796, 823 (1983).

N .Y.U.L
214.

See, e.g., \Veinrib, Insurance Justification, supra note 155.
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States 215 seems problematic. It is pointed out below that the chief difficulty with the view that common law courts sometimes decide cases in
accord ance with forward-looking exclusionary rules is that the courts
would have to be regarded as applying those rules retroactively. As Gary
Schwartz says, "when the goal of tort law is to influence d efendant
b·~havior, it is a dubious practice to apply a novel rule retroac tively; the
foreseeable the rule at the time the defendant acted, the more dubi , 1--- P
ou::;, ·~-.d·,_,

·o,..·~~tt.0e
,216
.~. .t a.~,...,_ \._., .....

There is, however, another interpretation of the behavior-guiding
asoect of m odern American tort law which is consistent with the general
contention stated above. Schwartz points out that if there is a foreseeab le
continuity in the way that the settled law is judicially modified over time,
then the conduct of potential defendants can at least sometimes be influenced in a desirable way through the knowledge that any new doctrine
will be applied retroactively. 217 This observation is interesting because it
suggests that in a behavior-oriented regime of tort law it is the overall
process of common law adjudication which does and should guide cond uct, not the individual "rules" as they happen to be formulated at any
one time. This suggests in turn that even where the common law emphasizes behavior-guiding considerations, the reasons for action to which the
lav.r gives rise are first- order rather than exclusionary in nature. Existing
common law doctine gives citizens some idea of the antecedent likelihood
that particular kinds of disputes will be settled in particular ways, and
citizens can also be expected to try to anticipate possible changes in the
settled law which could affect their present assessment of how future litigation is li kely to turn out. 218 This does not involve exclusionary guidance because at issue is an assessment of probabilities rather than
compliance vvith previously promulgated norms. If this is how modern
tort law in the United States should be understood, then a novel judicial
decision which relies primarily on behavior-guiding considerations will
nonetheless be based on mo rally relevant reasons: it is necessary to apply
the new doctrine retroactively in order to maintain the general incentives
in the system which encourage people to anticipate future doctrinal
changes. Of course if such a system is to work it will also be necessary to
ensure that the general direction of the law is more or less foreseeable.
215. Schwartz, supra note 213, at 816.
216. !d. at 828. Schwartz goes on to say that "[b]y contrast, retroactive application is quite
coherent when the new rule originates in notions of fairness .... " !d. This is consistent with what is
said infra about retroactivity and the common law in the text accompanying notes 236-39.
217. I d. at 826-27.
218. This is consistent with what is said infra in the text accompanying notes 240-43 about the
nature of the reasons to which the common law gives rise.
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T he degree of foreseeability that would be optimal is an open question ,
bm there is no reason to thin k that people vvould need to have anything
li ke certain foreknowledge of how the law will change.
8.

Does th e Comrnon Law Provide Exclusionary Guidance for
Citizens?

Suppose that common law courts characteristically decide private
L::c \V cases on the basis of morally relevant reasons alone. A1so assume, o:n.
th e basis of previous arguments, that they adhere to a non-exclusionary
conception of precedent. G iven these assumptions, can th e claim that
the courts are lay ing down exclusiona ry rules for the general population
be defend ed? Si nce by hypothesis the courts are not deciding cases by
adop ting forward-looking exclusionary rules, it is impossible to maintain
that they are providing exclusionary guidance for citizens with respec t to
behavior that occurs before a dispute takes place. 21 9 M ight it then be
argued that the legal system gives rise to exclusionary rules which take
hold after a dispute has arisen and which state, for example, that A must
pay B damages where the facts are such and such? T his claim is also
problematic, for two reasons. First, the common law does not force disputants to accept its solutions; not only do they not have to take their
dispute to court if neither insists on doing so, but the law condon es and
even encourages settlement, which is generally recognized to involve
extra-legal, strategic considerations such as the relative bargaining power
of the parties. T he second and more important point is that the currently
accepted di spute settling standards of the common law are always subj ect
to i:etroacti ve modification which could possibly be, and sometimes is,
quite rad ical in character.
Raz says t hat the action -guiding nature of legal standards is determined by the intentions of the courtsY 0 But in light of the two points
just mentioned, it does not seem sensible to suppose that courts regard
the sett led law as consisting of exclusionary rules which are intended to
govern post-dispute conduct. The better view is that the system of courts
which exercises jurisdiction over private law matters constitutes a kind of
public resource of which citizens may avail themselves in order to have
their disputes resolved if at least one of the parties requests this . T he
sett led law consists of presumptions about how particular kinds of disputes will be deal t v.;ith should they ever reach court. Wh ile the court
2 i 9. Many sta ndards of th e com mo n law co uld no t in any event be construed as p roviding predispute exc lusionary guida nce. Consider, fm exampl e, doctrines of stri c t liability.
220. J. RAZ. supra note 84, at 228-32 .

.
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will by means of such presumptions give weight to the reasoning of prior
similar cases, it is possible that a given dispute will in the end be resolved
in some other way. So far as citizens are concerned, the fact that these
presumptions exist gives rise to first-order reasons which they can take
into account in determining whm they ought to do, both before and after
a dispute arises; they are not, however, bound by those presun-1ptions in
an exclusionary sense.
Assume nmv that R az is correct in maintaining that comlT;on lav;
courts decide at least son1e unregulated disputes by adopting forwardlooking exclusionary rules for citizens. Continue to assume as well that
the courts adhere to a non-e xclusionary concepti on of precedentY 1 If
the first of these assumptions is true, then Raz is immediately in tro uble
on the normative side of his thesis that "courts act and should act just as
legislators do .... " 222 T he difficulty is that the forward -looking rules,
which by hypothesis reflect reasons that people were not in a position to
act upon before th e ru le was adopted, will be applied retroactively to the
case at hand. 223 They will be applied, that is to say, to evaluate the conduct of individuals who at the time that they acted did not have reason to
behave or refrain from behaving in the way indicated by the rule. 224 Raz
is aware of this implication of his theory and gives the impression of
being uncomfortable about it, but at the same time he also downplays the
unpalatable aspects of retroactive judicial lawmaking. He states that the
only objection to retroactivity in this context "is based on the frustration
of justified expectations," and that this is an objection that "has no force
at all when unregulated disputes or any hard or controversial legal case is
221. This means that from the point of view of the courts almost every dispute is unregulated in
Raz's sense. It follows that the number of potential cases in which forward-looking exclusionary
rules can be adopted is very large.
222.

J. RAZ, supra note 3, at 197.

223. I am using the term "'retroactive"' to describe the settlement of disputes arising out of past
conduct in which the court relies on considerations that had not, at the time that the conduct took
place, received explicit judicial recognition as standards appropriate for resolving di:;putes of the
kind in question. This characterization of retroactivity is different from, but compatible with, that of
Stephen Munzer, who says that a law is retroactive '"if it alters the legal status of acts that were
performed before it came into existence.'" Munzer, Retroactive Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 373, 373
(1977). It should be noted that Munzer further develops this idea within the framework of an essentially positivist theory of validity.
224. It is true that in some American jurisdictions prospective law-making is an accepted judicial technique. This is not neccss:1rily incompatible with adjudicativism, although l shall not try to
argue in support of that conclusion here. The points that I wish to press for present purposes are
twofold. First, retroacti vc decis10nmaking is still the norm in most common law jurisdictions, and
so it is on that practice that a theory of the common law must concentrate. Second, as I shall argue
below, retroactivity is not necessarily a bad thing when it is viewed from an adjudicati•;ist rather
than a positivist perspective.
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concerned since no justifiable expectations can arise in such cases. " 225
Raz concedes that justified expectations will be frustrated in clear
instances of distinguishing and in cases of overruling, but asserts that the
objection to retroactivity extends no further. 226
Even apart from the serious nature of the unfairness which
acknowledges to occur when justified expectations are frus t rated, it is
wrong to say that this is the only objection to ret roactive judicial lavvmaking of the sort which his positivist interpretation of the common 1avi
countenances. Consider that it would ordinari ly be pointless to apply a
forward-looking exclusionary ru.le retroactively, since t he purpose of the
rule is precisely to guide people's future conduct and in the circumstances we are speaking about this would not be possible. 227 Consider
also that a forward-looking exclusionary rule is capable of displacing
people's moral rights, and while it might be perfectly acceptable for a
legislature to do this on a prospective basis, at a time when the expected
benefits of doing so were sufficiently great that it would be in everyone's
antecedent interest to have their rights so superseded, matters stand differently when the rule is introduced retroactively. Suppose that the
assumptions made earlier about the Learned Hand and Lord R eid formulations of the negligence standard are true, and that in a case of first
instance, where there are no general expectations (justified or otherwise)
about what the court might do, it decides the case on the basis of the
Learned Hand test. On an appropriate set of facts this could mean that a
moral right of reparation on the part of the plaintiff was overridden.
Even though this might be perfectly acceptable if done on a prospective
basis, it seems completely unjustified to take such action in a particular
225. J. RAZ, supra note 3, at 198.
226. Jd.
227. If there were a point to the retroactive application of a novel doctrine, then it is not likely
that that doctrine would be embodied in a forward-looking exclusionary rule. Recall that the primary justification for adopting such a rule is that, while it reflects reasons that people independently
have, it does so in circumstances where they would not be in a position to act on those reasons in the
absence of a publicly-adopted rule. See supra text accompanying note 205. If the new doctrine was
justified primarily by behavior-guiding considerations, then the legal system would presumably take
the form described supra in the text accompanying notes 217-18. The reasons for action that would
be generated for ordinary citizens would be first- order and not exclusionary reasons. The pragmatist
legal system which is described by Dworkin in Law's Empire and which, according to him, would
embrace retroactivity, is probably best understood in these terms. SeeR. DWORKIN, supra note 85,
at 155-57. Dworkin does mention one argument in favor of retroactivity, based upon the incentives
it creates for people to bring novel actions to court, which is admittedly compatible with the retroactive application of forward-looking exclusionary rules. !d. at 56. But this argument is almost certainly outweighed by the various disadvantages of applying such rules retroactively that are
described in the text.
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person's case after the fact, at a time when it is clearly not in that person's interest that this be doneY 8
T he most serious objection to the retroactive judicial application of
forward-looking exclusionary rules arises from the fact that it contravenes Raz's own positivist conception of the rule of law. According to
this conception, the rule of law is an instrumental virtue that a legal system possesses in proportion to its degree of efficiency in performing its
function , where that function is taken to be the exclusionary gu idance of
conduct : " [I]n the final analysis the doctrine rests on its basic idea that
the law shou ld be capable of providing efrective guidance. " 229 Retroactive lawmaking will general ly amount to a violation of this conception of
the rule of law because, as Raz himself notes, "[o]ne cannot be guided by
a retroactive law." 230 (Retroactivity is , of course, only one of the ways in
which the rule of law as thus conceived can be violated.) Raz states that
the rule of law is a "morally neutral" virtue in the sense that it is "neutral
as to the end to which the instrument [i.e., law] is put. " 23 I He nonetheless acknowledges that its violation can "insult human dignity, give free
rein to arbitrary power, frustrate one's expectations, and undermine
one's ability to plan." 232
Raz says that not every violation of the rule of law will give rise to
all of these evils. Yet there is no reason to think that in the context of
retroactive lawmaking by courts the only one that will be manifested is
the frustration of justified expectations. It should be clear that any of the
other evils Raz enumerates could appear here as well. Retroactive judicial lawmaking of the sort permitted by Raz's positivist theory of law
would not on ly defeat the expectations of particular individuals but could
al so lead to a general uncertainty among people who were afraid that the
same thing might happen to t hem. 2 33 T his would interfere with their
autonomy by impeding their ability to plan for the future. The retroactive implementation by judges of forward-looking exclusionary rules
would also seem to entail a lack of respect for people's autonomy, in that
the individuals directly affected would not be treated "as persons capable
of planning and plotting their future. " 234
22 8. C/ R . DWORKI N , PRI NC IPL E, supra not e 93 , at 283-89 (unfairness of adj udicating existing
cases by applying no vel principl es the adoption of which on a forward-looking basis would be in
everyone"s antec ed ent interest).
229 . J. RAZ , supra note 3, at 218.
230. !d. at 214.
231. !d . a t 226.
232. Jd. at 222.
233. C/ id.
234. !d. at 221.
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Re troacti ve judicial lawmaking of the sort under scrutiny is thus a
much mo re serious m atter, from the perspective of Raz's own conception
of the ru le of law, than he acknow ledges. T here are also implications for
his general theory of law beca use the conceptual connection th a t he perceives betvveen the function of law, which is to guide behavior by means
of exclusionary ru les, and the role of the courts, wh ich is to evaluate
cond uct on the basis of those san1e rules, is sev red if the courts fail to
t~pp ly exisTing la·w; given our ear lier conclusion that the co urt:; a dhere to
a n cn-exclusionary conceptio n of precedent, retroactivit y -.;.;ill often
::ntail just such fa ilure. A s Raz himself says, " it is obvious that it is futile
w guide one's action on the basi s of the law if when the maHer comes to
adjud ication the courts w ill not ap ply the law and will ac t for som e oth er
reasons." 235 It has already been contended that, as an empiri cal matter,
common law courts do not decide cases by im plementing for ward-looking exclusionary rules and then applying them retroactively. If this is
wrong, and courts often do adopt such rules while at the same time
reserving the ability to reject or revise them in accordance with a nonexclusionary conception of precedent, then Raz would be correct to conclude that the common law process generates standards that are
(intended to be) exclusionarily binding for citizens but not for judges.
This would be J. hollow victory, however, since by his own lights the re
would be something very wrong with the common law .

9.

The Adjudicativist Conception of the Com mon La ¥v: Final
Observarions

There is clearly a great deal more to be said about both adjudicativism genera lly and about the adjudicativis t conception of the common law
in particular. It will only be possible here to consider very briefly some
of the more obvious objections that might be made to that conception,
;md to add a few final observations abo ut its theoretical character.
F irst, could R az claim that the adjudicativist conceptio n of the common law is in no better state than the positivist conception because it too
condones retroactive lawmaking? So long as it is true th at common law
courts characteristicall y decide private law cases on the basis of morall y
relevant reasons, the answer to thi s question is no. If tha t contention
holds then courts settle d isputes on the basis of m oral considerations that
are applicable to those very disputes, even if the j udicial articulation of
those considerations sometim es necessaril y takes place after the events in
2.\5 .

!d. at 2!7.
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question occurred. 23 "' The positivist conception of the r ule of law 1s not
generally applicable, moreover, to civil disputes, at least so far as retroactivity is concerned. 237 The most important domain in which the positivist conception h olds sway (and, it should be emphasized, qu ite properly
holds S\vay) is the criminal law. In a criminal case the only " d ispute" is
about whether or not the accused really did fall below some specified
standard of conduct at a time when he possessed the requi site mental
state; if it cannot be shown beyond a reasonable dou bt that he is gu ilty,
then neither he nor anyone else will be punished . Under these circum stances a general requirement of fair notice seems cornple!ely
unproblematic. Compare this with the usual torts case, in \Vhic h there
already exists a loss that cannot be m ade to disap pear and wh ich must be
absorbed by someone. Government decisions are inevitable in civil disputes, even if they are made only by default; accident losses must be
allocated, and determinations must be made about who is entitled to own
or possess disputed property. In light of these facts the position that the
defendant is always entitled to fair notice, so that the plaintiff has a right
to win only if there is a clear legal rule which demands that resu lt but
236. One of Dworkin's prima facie arguments in favor of the rights thesis was that o bjection s to
judicial or iginalit y based on th e retroactivity of judicial decisions had less force against arguments of
principle than arguments of policy. See R. DwORKIN, supra note 85, at 84 -86. lt is a som ewha t
similar argument that I am making here, except that I regard the point as extending beyond argu ments of principle to morally relevant reasons generally. The claim thus covers some arguments of
policy. though by no means all. There is also one o ther significant difference between my argum ent
and Dworkin's. The law, as Dworkin describes it in "Hard Cases," consists of settl ed institutional
history, including co mmon law decisions, together with the propositions which are enta iled by the
sou ndest rights-based moral justification o f that history. !d. at 105-23. He suggests that where the
law is thu s understood judicial decisions will not be retroactive at ail, since the coun wi il alway s b.:
enforcing a pre-exist ing right or duty. !d. at 84-86. This claim presupposes a different underst a nding of retroactivity from that out lined supra in not e 223. More importantly , Ken Kress has shown
that even given this definition of law retroactivity can not be avoided, since the rights th at exist at the
time of th e events in question can, due to subsequent devel opme nts in the se ttled law , differ fro m
those that exist at the time of adjudication. See Kress, Legal Reasoning and Coh erence Th eories:
Dworkin's Rights Th esis. Retroaclivity, and the Lin ear Order of Decisions, 72 CA L. L. REv. 369 , 3 7788 ( 1984). Kress ca ll s this the '"ripple effec t" argument. The formal precondit ions of Kress"s argument do not seem to apply to the version of adjudi cat ivism put forward in this Pape r, since th e
settled law is not rega rded as an unalterable given but only as a set of presumptions. Nonetheless. as
a practica l matter, the ripple effect will almost certainly occur here as well. The d ifference between
m y argument from retroactiv it y and Dworkin's derives from the fac t that for the reasons g iven in the
text I rega rd retroac tivity in the sense d efined supra iri note 223 as unavoid able in civil disputes. The
argument then sim ply is th at retroactive judicial decisions made on the bas is of morally relevant
reasons a re justifiable. whereas the retroactive judicial application of forward-lookin g exclusionary
rules is not.
237. It is not su rprising that adjudica tivists often reject the positivist conception of the rule of
law in fav o r of a more substantively-oriented conception. S eeR. DwoRKIN, PRINCIPL E, supra note
93, at 9-32; Weinrib, Intelligibility, supra note 155.
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that otherwise the defendant must win, 238 is a manifestly unsatisfactory
one. 239 T here is no morally acceptable analogue in civil law of the crim inal law principle nulla poena sine lege.
It should also be recalled that where a non-exclusionary doctrine of
precedent has been im plemented it does not necessarily follo v.; that someone's legitimate expectations have been defeated simply because a prior
case is overruled or disting uished . Legitimate expectations focu s on the
process, not on individ ual standards of the common law .2 -w It wo uld of
course be preferable if th e legal system always gave fair notice and never
took anyone by surprise in any way, but in a world of moral un certainty
that is impossible. Sometimes considerations of justice which fa vor one
of the parties to a dispute must outweigh those in terests of th e other
party which depend on his having relied on the probability that the process of dispute resolution would have a different outcome.
What then is the nature of the dispute settling standards of the common law, so far as ordinary citizens are concerned? T h ey are, essentially,
first-order reasons which are capable of guiding citizens' conduct in an
indeterminate rather than in an exclusionary sense by giving them some
idea of the anteceden t likelihood that a certain kind of dispute will be
settled one way rather than another. Such standards introduce a degree
of stability into the dispute settling process. Unlike exclusionary rules
they do not restrict choice but rather enhance it, since this stability curtails the interference with personal autonomy which the process wo uld
otherwise create. It is of course true that some standards of the common
law, such as those involving intentional torts like battery, are capable of
guiding behavior in a way not dissimilar to the criminal law. But that is
simply a consequence of the nature of the moral wrongs with which those
particular standards are concerned and of the fact that moral duties
23 8. Dworkin labe ls this pos ition "unilateral conventionalism" o r "unilateralis m." S ee R.
DwORKIN, supra no te 85, at 142-43.
239. Cf Schwartz, sup ra note 213 , at 822:
[I]f a ne w cause o f ac ti o n (in tort] is deri ved by the judicia ry from th e criteri o n of fairness.
then the defendant 's opportunit y for fair notice comes into co nflic t with th e plaintiff 's
opportunity to rece ive fair trea tme nt as fa irness is und erstood a t th e time o f his tri al; and it
is hardly clear wh y the defendant 's opportunity sho uld be gra nt ed priority over the
plaintiff's .
240. Cf id. at 8 17 : "As long as the general rules of the game make clear in adv a nce th a t the
spec ific rules of the game are subjec t to change, the player canno t com plain about pe r se un fa irn ess
merely because such a change is in fact effected." Schwartz goes on to say that " obv io usly an
emphasis on continuit y li es near the core of the common law. Firs t- order common law ru les m ay
gradua lly come and go, bu t the seco nd- order rules of th e common law process seem (relat iv ely)
consta nt. " I d. at 818. Schwartz does not say what he means by " seco nd-order rul es of t he com mo n
law process," b ut I would suggest tha t they are simply the we ightin g principles of the no n- exc lu sion a ry co ncepti o n o f precedent.

1989]

SECOND-ORDER .REASONS

themselves are, if R az is right, objective exclusionary reasons; 241 it is not
a characteristic shared by standards of the common law as a class. 242
Could th is be said to be a return to Holmes' "bad man" theory of
Lrw, 'Nhich holds that rhe only reasons for action to •;vhich the law gi ves
:rise are incentives to avoid un pleasant ness?H 3 This question must be
ansv;ered negatively because t here is no general recluctivist claim being
made about the nature of legal obligation. It is thus not denied that some
areas of th .;::
are :.:_,est analyzed in exclusionar y terrns. T here is also no
basis for insisting rhat the firs t - order reasons which t he common law
yields must be regarded with a cynical Ho lmesian eye. It is completely
consistent "With the view defended here that citizens be expected to try to
anticipate how the common law will change, relying in the process not
merely on social facts about t he judicial system but also on t heir own
j udgments and opinions about the moral questions in issue. This leads to
the furth er conclusion, it should be noted, that the sources thesis has no
m ore application to ord inary citizens, so far as their interaction with the
common law is concerned , than it does to judges.
One final observation is in order, and that is that the interpretation
of the common law process that has been outlined in this Paper is perfectly compatible with the conclusion that courts are legitimate authorities in Raz's sense. Courts issue what amount to exclusionary directives
to the immediate parties to an action, and so can be regarded as claiming
authority over persons to t hat extent. This is in no way inconsistent with
t he idea that they neither issue nor intend to issue general exclusionary
directives to the population as a whole.
CONCLUSION
Joseph Raz is one of our mos t important contemporary philosophers and legal theorists. H e has written with great insight about t he
241. See supra not es 48, 49.
242. It is not true, for example, of doctrines of strict liability in tort, nor is it true of the standard
of care in negligence law, which for substantive reasons of fairness is objective in nature and therefore incapable of guiding at !east some conduct on the part of at least some persons. See N. MACCmzrviiCK. The Ob/igarion of Repararion. in L EGAL RIGHT AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 212. 218-19
( 1982); Wc inrib, Moral Theory, supra note l 55, at 51-52. It is of course true that objective standards
occ0siona lly t!gure in the criminallav> , but I think it is generaily accepted that "a 'subjective test" of
criminal liability should be adhered to as far as possible .
:· H. HART. PUNISHMENT AND
RE SPONSIBJL!TY 63 (rev. ed. 1970). Such arguments as are made for relying on objective tests in the
criminal sphere are pragmatic in nature. looking. for example, to difficulties of proof, and hence are
very different from the arguments put forward in the civil sphere. See id. at 32-33, 152-57.
243.

O.'N. HO LMES, Th~ Parh ofrhe Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL P APERS 167, 170-75 (1920).
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nature of practical reasoning, and he has clarified much that was previously obscure about the relationship between legal and political philosophy on the one hand and practical phi iosophy on the other. Througho ut
this Paper I have been building on Raz's fundamental insight that a distinction must be dra wn between first- and second- or der reasons fo r
action, and the discussion of practical reasoning in the first half of the
Paper is, in essence, little more than a refi nement of Raz's account. Our
disagreement in the area of legal philosophy clearl y runs deeper, but it is
wo rt h stressing that I do not maintain that R az's positivist theory of law
is com pletely to be rejected. His an alysis is a compelling one so far as
certain areas of the law are concerned, and this is particularly true of
criminal law and stat u tory law generally. 244 T he arguments about th e
common law presented here are, therefore, not so much a call for the
rejection of positivism as they are a claim that positivism offers an incomplete account of the theoretical basis of law and so must be supplemented
in certain respects by adjudicativism. Moreover it should again be
emphasized that those arguments have been constructed on the foundation of Raz's notion of a second- order reason for action. It is only by
relying on Raz's own philosophical insights that I have been able to criticize his theory of law and offer an alternative analysis of certain legal
phenomena.

244.

S ee Perry , sup ra note 56, a t 255-57.

